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ABSTRACT. The Supreme Court regularly upholds federal legislation on grounds other
than those stated by Congress. Likewise, an appellate court may affirm a lower court judgment
even if the lower court's opinion expressed the wrong reasons for it. Not so in the case of judicial
review of administrative agencies. The established rule, formulated in SEC v. Chenery Corp., is
that a reviewing court may uphold an agency's action only on the grounds upon which the
agency relied when it acted. This Article argues that something more than distrust of agency
lawyers is at work in Chenery. By making the validity of agency action depend on the validity of
the agency's justification, Chenery's settled rule enforces an aspect of the nondelegation doctrine
that has been obscured by more recent decisions that understand nondelegation as involving
only a demand for legislative standards, or "intelligible principles." The neglected arm of the
nondelegation doctrine, which Chenery enforces, holds that a delegation is constitutionally valid
only if it requires the agency exercising the delegated authority to state the grounds for its
invocation of power under the statute. Chenery's enforcement of this norm polices the political
accountability of agency action by ensuring that accountable decision-makers, not merely agency
lawyers, have embraced the grounds for the agency's actions, and it promotes the regularity and
rationality of agency decision-making by enforcing a practice of reason-giving. This
nondelegation account of Chenery explains why agencies must engage in reasoned decision-
making to obtain deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Chenery insists that, to receive Chevron deference, accountable agency actors must explain the
bases for their decisions that bind with the force of law. By grounding Chenery in the
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, this account also suggests that the President's own
exercise of statutory power is not immune from Chenery's demands.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies may act with the force of law, but their obligations
to give reasons for their decisions are very different from those that apply to
Congress or the federal courts. A background rule of constitutional law is that
Congress is not required to "articulate its reasons for enacting a statute."'
Thus, a court generally may uphold the constitutionality of federal legislation
despite the fact that Congress has not provided any formal statement of
reasons for it. A similar rule of review applies to appellate consideration of
lower court judgments. The settled principle is that if the "decision below is
correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong
ground or gave a wrong reason."2
Precisely the opposite background presumption applies to administrative
agencies. One "fundamental" and "bedrock" principle of administrative law is
that a court may uphold an agency's action only for the reasons the agency
expressly relied upon when it acted.3 The Supreme Court's 1943 decision in
SEC v. Chenery Corp. provides the classic formulation of this principle in
American administrative law: "[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were
those upon which its actions can be sustained." 4 Thus, in sharp contrast to the
1. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (198o); see also infra Subsection I.C.i
(discussing this background rule).
2. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937); see also infra Subsection I.C.2 (discussing this
settled rule). See generally People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d
17, 23 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting the contrast between the role of reasons in review of
district court decisions and in review of agency action); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like
Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 17, 19-26 (2001) (describing the contrasts among the role of reasons in judicial review
of agency action, legislation, and judicial decisions).
3. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Konan v. Attorney Gen. of the
U.S., 432 F.3d 497, 5O1 (3d Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (characterizing the rule as "well
established"); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978) (stating that the Court has made this rule "abundantly clear"). See generally
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 8o (1943). For an example of reliance on the
Chenery principle in the Supreme Court's last Term, see Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. 1613,
1615 (20o6), in which the Court remanded a case based on the Chenery rule.
4. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 95; see also id. at 87 ("Since the decision of the Commission was
explicitly based upon the application of principles of equity announced by courts, its validity
must likewise be judged on that basis. The grounds upon which an administrative order
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.").
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background presumption in constitutional review of legislation and in
appellate review of lower court judgments, the court reviewing an agency
action will not supply or substitute justifying reasons on behalf of the agency.
The Chenery principle makes the validity of agency action depend upon the
validity of contemporaneous agency reason-giving.
The Chenery principle has been taken as settled since it was announced, and
administrative law has grown up around it, incorporating the principle into
new structures. The growth and shifts in administrative law since Chenery have
been significant: to name a few headliners, the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), s the Supreme Court's development of the Chevron
doctrine 6 and the hard look mode of review,7 presidential assertion of
increasingly formal review and influence over agency action, 8 and Congress's
continued allocation of vast discretionary powers to administrative agencies.
Throughout these developments, which have come to characterize
contemporary administrative governance, the Chenery principle has quietly and
steadily grown in scope. The Chenery decision itself involved review of a formal
adjudication, in which the SEC had relied upon erroneous legal principles to
justify a decision that might have been sustained on other grounds.9 The
principle now applies in review of every form of agency action, from agency
rulemaking to informal adjudication, as well as in review of all manner of
deficiencies in agency fact-finding and insufficient statements of reasons, not
merely to agency reliance on legally erroneous grounds.1"
The persistence and extension of the Chenery principle have had
tremendous practical significance for administrative government. At its core,
the Chenety principle directs judicial scrutiny toward what the agency has said
on behalf of its action, not simply toward the permissibility or rationality of its
ultimate decision; Chenery links permissibility to the agency's articulation of
5. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also infra
text accompanying notes 217-220 (providing a brief account of the Chevron doctrine).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, iol HARv. L. REV. 421, 463-74
(1987) (characterizing the hard look doctrine, beginning in the late 196os and early 1970s, as
a requirement that agencies - and courts themselves - take a close look at regulatory benefits
and disadvantages); see also infra text accompanying notes 84-85 (discussing the hard look
doctrine).
8. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272-2302 (2001)
(documenting the rise of presidential dominance of the administrative state and the use of
regulatory review).
9. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 95.
io. See infra Subsection I.B.i.
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the grounds for its action. On the one hand, that focus of judicial review gives
agency officials strong incentives to attend to the justifications they provide for
their actions, and it has helped make explicit reason-giving a major part of the
industry of the administrative state. On the other hand, even with tremendous
resources devoted to contemporaneous justification, the inadequacy of an
agency's contemporaneous explanation for its decisions remains one of the
most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.1
Despite the fixed character of the Chenery principle and its far-reaching
impact on administrative governance, there is a curious uncertainty concerning
its basis and its fit with the core principles of administrative law that have
developed alongside it and with doctrines of judicial review more generally. At
times, courts have attributed the principle to the APA,' 2 a statute enacted after
Chenery that is silent on this rule of review. 3 Others have claimed that the
Chenery principle is a necessary condition for judicial review' 4 or an expression
of Article III limitations on the judicial power'"- stances that are difficult to
square with the fact that federal courts routinely supply or substitute reasons
on behalf of Congress and lower courts when reviewing those actors' decisions.
Still others have helpfully suggested that the Chenery principle has a basis in
separation of powers principles, but they have not specified the parameters of
the separation of powers principle that Chenery reflects. 6
11. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 199o DuKE L.J. 984, 1035 tbl.6 (showing that 20.7% of remands
in 1985 were based on an inadequate agency rationale); Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to
Administrative Law, Keynote Address at the Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting
(Oct. 1987), in 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528 (1988) (reporting that nearly one-third of the
D.C. Circuit's reversals or remands in direct agency appeals between April 1987 and April
1988 occurred because the agency's rationale was inadequate); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L.
REv. 61, 72 (1997) (suggesting that inadequate agency reasoning is the most frequent
ground for judicial rejection of agency decisions).
12. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1998)
(suggesting that the APA established a scheme of reasoned agency decision-making that
courts enforce through the Chenery principle); see also infra Section II.A.
13. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); see also infra Section II.A.
14. See Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 94 ("[C]ourts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are
advised of the considerations underlying the action under review."); see also infra note 102
(citing cases).
is. See infra Section II.B.
16. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) ("The precept that the agency's rationale must be stated by the agency itself
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This Article aims to provide an alternative understanding of the Chenery
principle and to expose its connections to other central features of
administrative law, including the Chevron doctrine. It argues that although the
conventional justifications for the Chenery principle are inadequate, the
principle has a constitutional foundation. Specifically, the Chenery principle is a
default rule of statutory construction that implements the nondelegation
doctrine in ways that complement and reinforce that doctrine's other modes of
enforcement.
The current nondelegation doctrine requires that when Congress grants
binding authority to another institution, Congress must specify an "intelligible
principle" or a standard to which the agency must conform.17 Though this
requirement is now treated as a stand-alone test for assessing whether a
delegation exceeds Congress's constitutional authority, it was not always so.
Instead, this formulation emerged as one aspect of a two-part evaluation:
whether the statutory grant conditioned the exercise of authority upon an
agency's stating the grounds for its invocation of the statutory authority; and
whether the legislation included a sufficient standard to guide the agency's
discretion in making that determination. The Supreme Court has enforced the
former requirement by treating the failure of agencies to make such an express
statement not only as a statutory violation, but also as a violation of the
constitutional requirements governing delegation. While this requirement of
an express statement of the agency's predicate grounds for action has slipped
from constitutional doctrine, the Chenery principle's prohibition on post hoc
rationales enforces this arm of the nondelegation doctrine. On this view, the
nondelegation doctrine operates not merely to constrain the scope of discretion
Congress may vest in others, but also to impede Congress from giving away its
own prerogative to establish binding norms without providing justification for
them.
The Chenery principle also promotes core values of the nondelegation
doctrine in ways that supplement the enforcement of the intelligible principle
requirement. The Chenery principle operates both to bolster the political
accountability of the agency's action and to prevent arbitrariness in the
agency's exercise of its discretion. It provides assurance that accountable
stems from proper respect for the separation of powers among the branches of
government."); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 427-35 (concluding that the requirement of adequate reasons for agency
action is a matter of separation of powers).
17. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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agency decision-makers, not merely courts and agency lawyers, have embraced
the grounds for the agency's actions, and that the agency decision-makers have
exercised their judgment on the issue in the first instance.
This understanding of the Chenery principle has several implications for
contemporary administrative law; in particular, it clarifies the relationship
between the Chenery and the Chevron doctrines and exposes the extent to which
they are conceptually intertwined. On the one hand, it shows that compliance
with the Chenery principle is not just a general feature of judicial review of
agency action, but also a necessary condition for an agency to receive deference
under Chevron. Indeed, on this understanding, Chenery provides a structural
check for the very presumptions of agency accountability, rationality, and
expertise upon which Chevron deference is based. Chenery is the coin with
which the agency pays for Chevron deference. On the other hand, Chevron
holds implications for Chenery's scope. Chevron clarifies that the range of
determinations entrusted to the agency includes the interpretation of
ambiguities and gaps in the statutes it administers.' 8 And once the delegation
of authority includes interpretive authority, as Chevron requires, the agency's
explanation for its interpretative decisions falls within Chenery's scope.
The nondelegation account of the Chenery principle also has intriguing
implications for the scope of the President's duty to give reasons when a statute
authorizes him to act with binding legal force. If the Chenery principle enforces
the nondelegation doctrine, its foundation is sufficiently general to suggest that
it should apply to the President when he exercises statutory authority to act
with the force of law. Many of the Supreme Court's central nondelegation
decisions involved grants of power to the President. The Supreme Court's
enforcement of the requirement of express reason-giving has not excepted the
President from its scope, suggesting prima facie grounds for not excusing the
President from the Chenery principle. This treatment of the President's
assertions of statutory power as on par with those of agencies also suggests that
if the President were to receive Chevron deference, then, like an agency, he
could do so only if his actions complied with the Chenery principle.
Part I of this Article provides a brief account of the Chenety principle as it
emerged from two Supreme Court decisions, its growth beyond those
decisions, and a comparison of the principle to the background rule in other
public law contexts, such as constitutional review of legislation and appellate
review of judgments. Part II examines the conventional accounts of the
principle and aims to show why they are inadequate. Part III introduces the
nondelegation doctrine and discusses its connection to the Chenery principle.
18. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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Part IV traces the implications of the nondelegation account for administrative
law, and Part V addresses the special case of the President.
I. THE CHENERY PRINCIPLE IN CONTEXT
Before examining the foundations of the Chenery principle, it is useful to
sketch the principle's operation in current law. That sketch reveals the
differences between the Chenery principle and the rules of judicial review that
operate in other public law contexts -differences that have significant practical
consequences for administrative governance.
A. The Chenery Decisions
The basic Chenery principle is the "simple but fundamental rule... that a
reviewing court in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency."19 The Supreme
Court's well-known pair of Chenery decisions provides a good illustration of its
operation.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 charged the
Securities and Exchange Commission with administering the reorganization of
public utility holding companies, an issue of great concern at the time."° In the
order that gave rise to the Chenery litigation, the SEC prohibited officers and
directors of a public utility holding company from engaging in stock purchases
during reorganization." The SEC had based this prohibition solely on fiduciary
principles, concluding that such sales would violate the insider's fiduciary
duties.2" In its first Chenery decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the
SEC's reading of fiduciary law was incorrect. 3 The Court also strongly
suggested that the SEC had the power to prohibit these sales as an exercise of
ig. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
20. Ch. 687, § 11, 49 Stat. 803, 820-23 (repealed 2005). For a detailed and helpful account of the
Chenery litigation, PUHCA, and the political context in which the litigation occurred, see
Roy A. Schotland, A Sporting Proposition - SEC v. Chenery, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES
169, 169-73 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 20o6).
21. See Fed. Water Serv. Corp. (SEC Order 1), 8 S.E.C. 893, 917-19 (1941); see also Chenety I, 318
U.S. 8o, 81, 85 (1943).
22. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 93; see also id. at 87 ("[The SEC's] opinion plainly shows that the
Commission purported to be acting only as it assumed a court of equity would have acted in
a similar case."); SEC Order 1, 8 S.E.C. at 916-19 (revealing the same).
23. See Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 88, 93.
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its administrative powers under PUHCA. 4 But based on the principle that the
courts could not uphold an agency order on grounds other than those invoked
by the agency, the Court reversed and remanded: "We merely hold that an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the
agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be
sustained."" On remand, the agency reached the same conclusion prohibiting
the stock purchases, but this time it based its action on an exercise of its
administrative powers under PUHCA, 6 and the Supreme Court upheld the
order.27
The Chenery decisions thus make clear that it matters both who articulates
the legally sufficient basis to sustain the agency's ultimate decision and when
that justification comes. The agency itself, not its counsel or Department of
Justice (DOJ) lawyers defending the action, must state reasons sufficient to
justify the agency's action, and that statement must accompany the action
itself, not follow later. 8 The question is not simply whether the agency's
ultimate action is permissible, but whether the agency has offered a valid
explanation for it.
24. Id. at 92 ("Had the Commission, acting upon its experience and peculiar competence,
promulgated a general rule of which its order here was a particular application, the problem
for our consideration would be very different."). The Court had occasion to address this
point because, in the Solicitor General's brief on behalf of the SEC, the government
attempted to recast the SEC's order, arguing that the agency had adopted the prohibition on
the sales "[i]n exercising its duty" under PUHCA to determine whether the proposed
reorganization plans were "detrimental to the public interest or the interests of investors or
consumers" and whether they were "fair and equitable." Brief for the SEC at 22-23, Chenery
1, 318 U.S. 8o (No. 254).
25. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 95.
26. Fed. Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 246 (1945); see Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947)
(noting that the SEC reached the same conclusion based on the exercise of its power under
PUHCA).
27. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 209. Chenery II itself stands for an equally fundamental principle of
administrative law, that agencies have broad discretion to choose the procedural form, such
as rulemaking or adjudication, through which they act. See id. at 203. For discussion of why
the Chenery I principle interestingly does not apply to the agency's choice of policymaking
form, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 1383,
1412-42 (2004).
28. The justification need not be published at exactly the same moment as the agency's action.
See Tabor v. Joint Bd. for the Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 711 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Rather, the justification and the action must be announced "close enough together in
time so that there is no doubt that the statement accompanies, rather than rationalizes[,] the
rules." Id.
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B. The Chenery Principle Beyond the Chenery Decisions
Perhaps prompted by the very general terms in which the Chenery decisions
articulated this principle (or perhaps reflecting the generality of its underlying
basis), the Supreme Court has extended the demand for explicit reason-giving
to virtually every form of agency action and every conceivable type of deficiency
in an agency's stated justification for its action.
1. Forms ofAgency Action
In the Chenety decisions, the prohibition of post hoc rationales applied to
formal, adversarial agency adjudication.29 After the Chenery decisions and the
APA's enactment, it was not clear whether the principle would extend beyond
formal adjudication to notice-and-comment rulemaking or to myriad other
forms of informal agency action. One could imagine that the distinctive
concerns present in formal, on-the-record proceedings might confine the
principle to that context. For instance, the Chenery principle might be
understood as implementing or reinforcing the APA's requirement that an
agency provide an extensive statement of the basis for its decision in on-the-
record proceedings.3"
The Supreme Court has moved with ease and with little focused attention
past these possible grounds for limiting Chenery's reach, applying it to review
of agencies' informal action31 and to notice-and-comment rulemaking
conducted under APA § 553 .32 Consider Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe.33 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision
by the Secretary of Transportation to authorize the expenditure of federal
29. Chenery I was decided before the enactment of the APA in 1946, but the agency action at
issue was clearly a formal adjudication by the APA's terms and thus would have been
governed by s U.S.C. §5 556 and 557.
3o. The APA provides that for on-the-record decisions the agency "shall include a statement of
... findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2000).
31. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139, 143 (1973); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,417-20 (1971).
32. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 34, 50 (1983) (relying on Chenery in reviewing notice-and-comment rulemaking);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 137, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); Pub.
Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carriers Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1211-12, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(same); see also Tabor, 566 F.2d at 710 (rejecting the suggestion that Chenery does not apply
in review of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
33. 401 U.S. 402.
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funds to support the construction of an interstate highway through a public
park in Memphis, Tennessee.3 4 The Secretary made no statement of reasons or
findings in support of his decision" and had no statutory obligation to do so.,
6
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, citing Chenery and its progeny, on
the ground that the lower courts had based their decisions on post hoc agency
rationalizations of the Secretary's decision in the form of litigation affidavits.17
Those post hoc rationalizations, the Court stated, "have traditionally been
found to be an inadequate basis for review.,,8
On the heels of Overton Park, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United
States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 39 illustrates the Court's
clear embrace of Chenery in review of notice-and-comment rulemaking. In State
Farm, the Court reversed and remanded a decision by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration to rescind requirements that passive restraints,
such as airbags or automatic feed seat belts, be installed in cars. 40 In defense of
its decision before the courts, the agency cited the difficulties that a mandatory
airbag standard would create.4" The Court swiftly rejected the relevance of
these arguments. "The short - and sufficient - answer to petitioners' submission
is that the courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for
agency action."" The Court then recited the "well established" rule that "an
agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency
itself."'43 Chenery's factual context as a formal adjudication did not matter to the
Court, which implicitly took the Chenery principle to state a more general rule
of review.
34. See id. at 405-06.
3S. Id. at 417.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 419-20.
38. Id. at 419.
39. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
40. See id. at 34, 57.
41. See id. at 49-50; see also Brief for the Federal Parties at 42-43, State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (Nos.
82-354, 82-355 & 82-396) (raising concerns based on comments in the legislative history
about the adaptability of airbags to smaller cars, indications that the utility of airbags was
limited to head-on collisions, and the cost of airbags).
42. State Farm, 463 U.S. at So.
43. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); and
Chenety I, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
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2. Types of Reason-Giving Deficits
Nor have courts cabined Chenery's application to the particular deficiency at
issue in Chenery -agency reliance on a legal error. In his classic discussion of
Chenety, Judge Friendly urged a distinction among reversals for inadequate
explanation of reasons, unsupportable reasons, and insufficient or erroneous
findings of fact.44 The courts, however, have generally not heeded these
distinctions4 and have instead applied the Chenery principle in all of these
circumstances.
46
For instance, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States47 reversed and
remanded an Interstate Commerce Commission order declining to intervene in
a labor dispute by invoking its cease-and-desist authority and instead
approving a trucking company's application to enter the relevant market."8
While the ICC's choice of remedy clearly depended upon findings of fact and
agency expertise, the Supreme Court found that the ICC's order included "no
findings and no analysis here to justify the choice [of remedy] made. '49 Citing
Chenery, the Court declined to embrace the ICC counsel's argument that a
44. See Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative
Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 206-22. Friendly suggested that a reversal for inadequate
explanation allows the court to ask the agency to think the issue over. See id. at 208. The
Chenery rule as properly understood -requiring reversals for reliance on incorrect reasons -
serves that second-look function as well, but also has the systemic effect of emphasizing to
agencies that wrong reasons "cannot be expected to stand." Id. at 210. Reversals for
insufficient or erroneous findings of fact also force agencies to act carefully, though Friendly
cautioned against a purist insistence on remand when the finding is one that the agency
could not have lawfully refused to make. See id. at 223-24. For Friendly, all three were
potentially valid grounds for reversal, but only the second was properly associated with
Chenery.
See id. at 206-22 (documenting decisions that conflate these distinct principles).
See, e.g., ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (stating that under
Chenery a reviewing court "may not affirm on a basis containing any element of discretion-
including discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities -that is not the basis
the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary judgment from the agency to the
court"). Overton Park and State Farm are convenient examples of applying Chenety in the
cases of insufficient reasons, see Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 417 (1971) (noting that the Secretary provided no explanation), and inadequate factual
findings, see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49-50 (stating that the agency offered post hoc findings
on the difficulties of the airbag rule).
371 U.S. 156.
48. See id. at 1
49. Id. at 167.
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cease-and-desist order would have been ineffective in resolving the disruptions
in service. s
Thus the general message to the agency is clear: under the Chenery
principle, there is no room for a "Brandeis brief' to defend agency action."s
Whatever the agency or DOJ lawyer is going to rely upon in defense of the
action, be it the underlying rationale or the supporting facts and analysis, must
be provided at the time the agency acts. 2
3. The Limits ofChenery
Courts have nevertheless recognized several limitations to Chenery's
application. 3 Two of these limitations are important for our later discussion of
the connection between the Chenery and Chevron doctrines.14 First, the Chenery
principle does not apply when a court reviews an agency's interpretation or
action under a statute that Congress has not entrusted to that agency's
administration. In Chenery II, the Court emphasized that the Chenery rule
pertains to a "determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone
is authorized to make."" Based on that limitation, courts have rejected the
invocation of the Chenery rule when the agency interprets the APA, 6 the
so. Id. at 168.
51. As an attorney, Louis Brandeis submitted his celebrated "Brandeis brief," a 113-page brief
providing empirical and factual support for the challenged statute, in Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (19o8), and then again in later litigation. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:
Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 982-83 (1999)
(describing Brandeis's tactics and assumptions about deference to the legislature).
52. Along these lines, Judge Patricia Wald has offered the pragmatic counsel to agency officials
that it is "more important to 'moot' the drafters of their regulations prior to issuance than
the lawyers who go to court to defend those regulations." Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at
Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 621, 639
(1994).
53. For a compact and recent exposition of the doctrine and its limits, see Harold J. Krent,
Ancillary Issues Concerning Agency Explanations, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 197 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005).
54. See infra Part IV.
55. 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
56. See Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, io6o (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
when the issue is compliance with the APA's procedural requirements, as opposed to the
agency's substantive mandate under enabling legislation, the rule's validity turns solely on
compliance with the APA, not the agency's stated justification).
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), s7 or the Privacy Act 8 -statutes
that are not committed to any particular agency's administration.
5 9
Second, the Chenery prohibition does not apply when the agency's action is
compelled by statute. As Judge Friendly put it, "[W]hen agency action is
statutorily compelled, it does not matter that the agency which reached the
decision required by law did so on a debatable or even a wrong ground, for
remand in such a case would be but a useless formality."6 Based on this
premise, courts have declined to invoke the Chenety principle when the agency
may reach but one possible conclusion under the statute.
These two limitations show that agency explanation is a condition of the
validity of agency action only when the action is taken under a statute that
Congress has vested the agency, not the courts, with the power to implement,
and only with regard to issues not clearly resolved by the statute. But even with
these limitations, there is a vast domain of agency action for which Chenety
links the action's validity to the agency's expressed justification.
C. The Distinctiveness ofChenery as a Principle ofJudicial Review in Public
Law
The Chenery principle is an outlier when viewed alongside other
frameworks of judicial review in American public law. 62 As we have seen,
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000); see Olmstead Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. United States,
793 F.2d 2o, 208 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986) (declining to apply Chenery to the agency's
interpretation of NEPA).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000); see Louis v. Dep't of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977-78 (9 th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Privacy Act was not committed to the Department of Labor's
administration and thus that Chenery did not apply to the Department's rationale for
withholding documents under the Act); Fattahi v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
328 F. 3 d 176, 179-8o (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Chenery did not apply because the issue
before the court was a violation of the Privacy Act, not a decision entrusted to the agency).
sg. See Shea, S & M Ball Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 929 F.2d 736, 739 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (declining to apply Chenety to the review of Benefits Review Board actions
in which the agency's interpretations of the statute were not entitled to special deference
from the courts and the issue was "within the power of the appellate court to formulate").
60. Friendly, supra note 44, at 210.
61. See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1094, 1099-1102 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(affirming a Department of Commerce antidumping proceeding in which the "plain
language of the statute compel[led] the conclusion").
62. For a helpful comparative perspective and critique of reason-giving duties in the United
Kingdom and beyond, see Michael Taggart, Reinventing Administrative Law, in PUBLIC LAW
IN A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION 311, 324, 328-35 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland
966
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:952 2007
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHENERY
Chenety denies courts the power to affirm agency action on grounds not stated
by the agency. Precisely the opposite background presumption applies in
judicial review of federal legislation or appellate review of lower court
judgments, in which reviewing courts routinely supply or substitute rationales.
1. Constitutional Review
Judicial review of the constitutionality of federal legislation proceeds, of
course, from the long-held presumption of the constitutionality of Congress's
choices as an elected and coequal branch of government.6 3 In exercising judicial
review, the Court has implemented that presumption by upholding legislation
without requiring Congress to have provided reasons for it.
A brief passage in United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz succinctly
illustrates the contrasting background rule of review: "Where, as here, there
are plausible reasons for Congress's action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of
course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the
legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." 64 Far from making constitutional
validity depend on a statement of reasons by Congress, the Court views it as
"constitutionally irrelevant" whether Congress endorsed the set of reasons that
the Court views as justifying the legislation.6 s Indeed, at least within the
eds., 2003); and Michael Taggart, The Tub of Public Law, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 455,
476-79 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004).
63. For a classic statement of the grounds for this presumption of constitutionality, see James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv.
129, 144 (1893), which argues that the Supreme Court should declare federal legislation
invalid only when Congress has made a "very clear" mistake. Contemporary discussion of
this presumption is legion. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, ioo
MICH. L. REv. 8o, 85-91 (2001) (documenting the traditional presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation).
64. 449 U.S. 166, 179 (198o) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (196o)); see also Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:
Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1575, 1656 n.349 (2001) (collecting sources for this general rule, including
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
299 (1964)).
65. This is not to say that the reasons for the legislation are never relevant to constitutional
review. For instance, legislation enacted with an invidious discriminatory purpose is
unconstitutional. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (articulating the
constitutional standard); Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 193-94. But there is a difference between holding that an unlawful reason
undermines a law's constitutionality and affirmatively requiring justification.
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context of rational basis review, the Court's task is to discern whether it can
"perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did."66 Based on this presumption, it falls to litigators to articulate a basis upon
which the legislation may be upheld, making constitutional adjudication a
central locus for constitutional justification. In contrast, by prohibiting the
agency lawyer from performing the analogous task, the Chenery principle shifts
the locus of justification to the agency's own reason-giving at the time of its
action.
Several considerations underlie this judicial reluctance to impose an
uphold-only-for-reasons-given requirement in constitutional review of federal
legislation. First, and most fundamentally, applying a Chenery-style rule in
reviewing legislation would undermine core separation of powers principles.
Applying a Chenery rule would amount to a judicial direction as to how
Congress must go about exercising its own legislative powers across the
board. 6' As a coequal branch of government with its own electoral connection,
Congress need not legitimate each exercise of its constitutional authority; it
"need not answer to a technocratic ideal."68
Second, the Article I, Section 7 process for enacting legislation already
establishes a demanding standard for agreement among the Houses of
Congress and the President. 6' To impose the additional procedural
66. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
67. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv.
328, 375 (2001) ("Article I, Section 7 provides no warrant for a court, including the Supreme
Court, to refuse to enforce a duly enacted statute on the ground that Congress's formal
record does not establish the truth of an underlying congressional conclusion or
prediction."). Note that the Supreme Court has suggested that in the agency context, the
Chenery principle does impose a "general 'procedural' requirement of sorts by mandating
that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the
court to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of decision." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
68. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87, 140
(2001); see also Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 225-27 (1976)
(providing the classic statement of the distinction between demands for rational justification
in administrative and legislative processes).
69. The demanding character of the legislative process is often cited as a means of limiting the
influence of factions, of protecting persons in smaller states, and of improving the quality of
legislation. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance,
2000 SuP. CT. REV. 223, 238-40 (describing the benefits of the bicameralism and
presentment filters for legislation); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 8o TEX. L. REV. 703, 712-13, 731-44 (2002) (describing
bicamerialism and presentment as creating a supermajoritarian rule and defending that
rule's benefits to legislation).
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requirement on Congress of providing express justifications "could cause the
whole process to grind to a halt[,] .... making legislation far more difficult
and sometimes impossible. '70 At the very least, such a requirement would
induce Congress to expend more of its institutional resources justifying
legislation and therefore would constrain the amount of "other legislative work
that Congress [could] accomplish. 7 1
Third, applying a Chenery rule in the legislative process would create
significant unpredictability for Congress.72  In the agency context,
administrative law typically requires parties to state their objections to agency
action during the agency process prior to challenging the action in court. 73 No
such procedural requirements apply to Congress, and as a result, Congress is
even less well equipped to anticipate which aspects of its legislation it should
devote resources to explaining.74
Based on these concerns, scholars have sharply criticized a widely discussed
line of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade that has imposed
increasingly demanding requirements on Congress to justify the grounds for
its legislation, principally in the form of fact-finding requirements. 7' A central
thrust of this criticism is that in these decisions, the Court inappropriately
applied administrative law principles in review of the constitutionality of
legislation . 6 These decisions have deservedly attracted careful consideration.
70. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1332 (1999) (criticizing
scholarly defenses of heightened judicial inquiry in federalism cases into congressional
processes and justifications).
71. Colker & Brudney, supra note 63, at 121.
72. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 68, at 128-31 (arguing that "legislative record review" is
more unpredictable than hard look review because few process requirements apply to
legislative policy formulation).
73. Statutory requirements of exhaustion, ripeness, and finality all serve this purpose.
74- See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 68, at 128-31.
7s. Most scholars agree that this line of decisions began with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), and gained further strength in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), as well
as in decisions concerning how Congress may enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
such as City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See Bryant &
Simeone, supra note 67, at 332-54 (describing the evolution and its antecedents in First
Amendment decisions); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 68, at 1o9-19 (describing the
evolution).
76. This point is a central argument of Bryant & Simeone, supra note 67, at 331, 370-73, and
Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 68, at 90, 119-35. Professor Frank Cross has also decried
treating Congress like an agency in his critique of scholarly defenses of greater elaboration
requirements, see Cross, supra note 70, at 1331-35 (suggesting that applying hard look review
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For our purposes of drawing a contrast between constitutional and
administrative review, it suffices to note that these decisions have not reversed
the background presumption that Congress may legislate without stating
reasons. At most, they show that this presumption does not apply to particular
areas of heightened constitutional concern. And while the scholarly criticism of
these decisions has challenged the ways in which they treat Congress like an
agency, such as by requiring Congress to articulate the grounds for its actions,
it has not examined the justification for the Chenery principle in the
administrative setting.
The basis of Chenery in administrative law is in a sense the flip side of this
line of criticism. If there are objections to applying a Chenery rule to
constitutional review of legislation, are those objections peculiar to the review
of legislation, or are they also applicable to the principle in the administrative
law setting? I aim to defend Chenety's justification on the agency side of the
ledger (and thus to suggest obliquely that the objections to invoking the
Chenery principle in constitutional adjudication are peculiar to that context).
2. Appellate Review
Constitutional review is not the only mode of judicial review in which an
uphold-only-for-reasons-given rule does not apply. In Chenery I, Justice
Frankfurter carefully distinguished the principle from "the settled rule that, in
reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is
correct 'although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong
reason."' 77 This rule of appellate review is just as well established today as it
was at the time of Chenery.
78
in constitutional cases is unfounded), and Professors Ruth Colker and James Brudney have
been similarly critical, see Colker & Brudney, supra note 63, at 83 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court has treated Congress akin to an agency or lower court). The thrust of this
commentary can be seen as elaborating the grounds for Justice Breyer's criticism of the
Court in Garrett for "[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative
agency record." 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. 318 U.S. 8o, 88 (1943) (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)).
78. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 7o6, 722 n.3 (2001) (noting that
whether the reviewing court, not the agency, erred is irrelevant in view of the settled
Helvering rule); Palmer v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 356 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2004) ("We
may affirm on any ground with support in the record, even if it was not the ground relied
on by the District Court."); Kearney v. J.P. King Auction Co., 265 F.3d 27, 41 n.18 (lst Cir.
2001) (articulating the same rule and citing Helvering); Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc.,
722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); see also Helvering, 302 U.S. at 246 nn.4-5
(collecting authorities). But see EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 14o6, 1410 (D.C.
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As one early court characterized the rule, "[i]t is the correctness of the
judgment, not the legal reasoning by which it was reached, that an appeal
challenges."79 As the validity of the judgment is evaluated independently from
the reason given for it, an appellee can support the judgment with arguments
that "may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court," as long as
they stem from sources in the record.8° The motivating concern behind this
rule appears to be judicial economy: why remand to the lower court to correct
its reasoning when the judgment is correct and the appellate court could itself
correct the error?8' An account of the Chenery principle must explain why the
same logic is not sufficient in the agency context.
D. The Consequences of the Chenery Principle
The Chenety principle's stringent demand for agency explicitness, as
compared with other public law frameworks of review, has wide-ranging
consequences for administrative government. Importantly, it increases the
resources that agencies must devote to explaining the decisions they make.
The Chenery principle does not itself indicate how demanding a court will
be in assessing the reason provided by the agency. 82 A standard of review-
such as the APA's mandate for reversing agency action that is "arbitrary,
Cir. 1996) (noting that, in a review for abuse of discretion, "[w]ithout a full explanation, we
are unable to review the district court's exercise of its discretion").
79. In re Schwartz, 89 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1937); see also Stoffregen v. Moore, 271 F. 68o, 681
(8th Cir. 1921) ("The opinion may be wrong, and still the judgment be right.").
go. Schwartz, 89 F.2d at 173.
81. See Kearney, 265 F.3d at 41 n.18 (noting that this rule of appellate review, like the waiver of
arguments not presented to the trial court, is founded on judicial economy and basic
fairness). The rule would seem to promote fairness at least in the sense of not requiring the
litigant that wins a correct, but improperly justified, judgment to expend additional
resources in litigation.
82. If, as Professor Ronald Levin has suggested, administrative remedies are those options for
relief available to a court after it has determined that the agency has acted unlawfully, see
Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in
Administrative Law, 53 DuKE L.J. 291, 294 (2003), then the Chenery principle is not itself a
remedial doctrine. It rather imposes a validity condition for agency action. This does not
imply that the principle has no connection to remedies; in fact, it may have several strong
implications for the scope of judicial remedies. For instance, as Levin has suggested, the
principle appears to provide a persuasive justification for the remedial doctrine that a court
may correct an agency's error of law but lacks the power to order action that lies within the
agency's delegated power. See id. at 365-69 (suggesting that Chenery provides a source of
justification for the remedial doctrine of FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940)).
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law""s
and the judicial glosses on that mandate -determines how closely the court
will scrutinize agency action.
But once any given standard of review is joined with the Chenery principle,
the Chenery principle limits judicial review to the explanation the agency relied
upon when it acted. The combination of a searching standard of review-the
arbitrary and capricious standard, as widely read -with the Chenery principle is
what characterizes the contemporary hard look doctrine of judicial review.
With this combination, Professor Martin Shapiro has observed, courts have
held that "a rule was not arbitrary and capricious only when it was well
reasoned and well supported by facts." 8' As a practical matter, this conjunction
requires that agencies specifically explain their policy choices, their
consideration of important aspects of the problem, and their reasons for not
pursuing viable alternatives.8s The consequences of this regime are, by now,
familiar. Intensive judicial scrutiny under the hard look doctrine is widely
viewed as a central cause of the ossification of administrative government.8 6
Because virtually any failure to explain the basis for an action can provide
grounds for reversal under hard look review, agencies have incentives to
83. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A) (2000).
84. Shapiro, supra note 65, at 185; see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 48-50 (1988) (describing the conjunction of the
hard look standard and the requirement that an agency explain all aspects of its decision).
85. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43, 47-48 (1983).
86. See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 68, at 128 (agreeing with others that frequent
judicial remands and detailed scrutiny of agency rationales have contributed to the
"ossification" of regulatory process); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory
Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 394 (2000) ("[T]he prospect of
facing hard look review by the courts has caused administrative agencies to become reluctant
to use the informal rulemaking process, with its attendant benefits of clear prior notice,
widespread public participation, and comprehensive resolution of issues affecting large
numbers of people or economic activities."); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 528 (1997)
("[lit has become so difficult for agencies to promulgate major rules that some regulatory
programs have ground to a halt and others have succeeded only because agencies have
resorted to alternative policymaking vehicles."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity,
Some Thoughts] (noting that although no empirical studies of the burden on agency
rulemaking exist, "it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that it is much harder for an
agency to promulgate a rule now than it was twenty years ago"); Pierce, supra note ii, at 71
(suggesting that the detailed demand for contemporaneous explanation requires agencies to
commit tens of thousands of hours per major rule).
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anticipate and address any issue that might attract attention. 87 The burden of
detailed and express justification for virtually every type of regulatory action,
from significant rulemaking to informal decisions about whether to grant a
bank a charter, has slowed down the regulatory process.88 Even if Chenery were
paired with a more relaxed standard of review, it would have a similar, though
less pronounced, effect. The principle would still create incentives for agencies
to devote more resources than they otherwise might to contemporaneous
explanation of their actions.
Moreover, despite the industry of agency justification that the Chenery
principle has helped to create, inadequate explanation is still among the most
common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.89 These remands have a
profound impact on agency priorities. Not only do they provide systematic
incentives for agencies to lengthen and to enhance the proffered explanations
of their decisions, but Chenery remands clearly impose costs on the agency in
the specific cases in which they occur, forcing the agency to re-rationalize its
actions or to alter its course. 90
87. Cross, supra note 70, at 1331 n.154.
88. See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 86, at 1387-88 (documenting that the time required
for typical OSHA rulemaking has increased from six months to five years with increased
judicial review). The extent to which the overall quality of regulation has improved as a
result of the resources agencies must devote to express reason-giving and to satisfying hard
look review is a large, open question. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of
Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 27 (1991) (suggesting that demanding judicial review of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could induce the agency to hire more lawyers,
which would emphasize the "apparent quality of decisionmaking over actual quality of
decisionmaking"); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 629-35 (1997) (suggesting
that active judicial review can deter the worst abuses of power); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial
Review of Agency Action: The Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper
Incentives, 44 DuKE L.J. 1133, 1147-49 (1995) (suggesting that intrusive judicial review creates
incentives within agencies to emphasize law over policy and shifts power to agency and DOJ
lawyers). Professor Matthew Stephenson has recently proposed a justification of hard look
review that does not depend on the capacity of courts to assess the soundness of the
justification offered by the agency. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of
"Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (20o6). Rather, Stephenson argues
that the requirement of detailed explanation allows the agency to signal to the reviewing
court its own assessment of the benefits of the action through a relatively high-quality
explanation for its action. See id. at 766-67, 772-75.
89. See sources cited supra note ii.
go. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 11, at 1047 (reporting that approximately 37% of remanded
cases produced "major changes" in the agency's post-remand positions, and suggesting that
"the mere occurrence of a remand, without more, frequently causes an agency to alter its
original position in important ways").
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II. THE CHENERY PRINCIPLE'S CONVENTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
How, then, is the Chenery principle's demand for agency articulation
justified and distinguished from the background rules of review applicable to
Congress and lower courts? At least from the perspective of identifying
Chenery's foundations, a tidy and frequently invoked answer is that the Chenery
principle is required by the APA. This Part disputes that claim and argues that
the Chenery principle's association with the APA is best explained on more
general grounds. Nor is Chenery required by the nature of judicial review, nor
by Article III. The most promising conventional view of Chenery instead stems
from the idea that Congress has delegated to agencies, not the courts, the
exclusive authority to select the reasons for their actions. This delegation
theory provides a useful starting point for a justification of Chenery, but it is
incomplete. In particular, it requires an account of why we should make that
presumption about Congress's delegation to agencies. The nondelegation
argument in Part III offers such an account.
A. As an APA Requirement
The first conventional justification for the Chenery principle takes it to be
required by the APA.91 Because Chenery was decided in 1943, three years prior
to the APA's enactment, the claim that Chenery is justified by the APA has an
anachronistic awkwardness to it, at least as applied to the decision itself.
Notwithstanding the fact that Chenery predates the APA, the APA has two
sets of provisions that could provide a basis for Chenety's current application:
the requirement of reason-giving for certain forms of agency action and the
specification of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Examination of
the statute, however, reveals that neither of these provisions requires the
Chenety prohibition.
First consider the APA's reason-giving requirements. The APA requires
agencies to provide a statement of reasons for their actions when they engage
91. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374-75 (1998)
(suggesting that the APA established a scheme of reasoned agency decision-making that
courts enforce through the Chenery principle); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. NLRB, 309 F.3d
578, 583 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that the APA's reasoned decision-making standard
involved applying the Chenery rule); Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. Dep't of Agric., 876
F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the court could not require a
contemporaneous statement of reasons for a rule that was exempt from the APA's notice-
and-comment requirements).
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in informal rulemaking and formal adjudication.92 Requiring an agency to give
reasons does not itself entail that courts may uphold an agency action only on
the basis of the reasons the agency gave at the time it acted. For instance, Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires federal district
courts to provide a statement of their findings of fact and conclusions of law. 93
When appellate courts review judgments, however, they can affirm on any
basis supported by the record, even if it was not the basis of the district court's
disposition.94 Thus, some additional grounds are required to move from the
APA's reason-giving requirements to the Chenery principle.
Indeed, the suggestion that Chenery is required only insofar as the APA
itself imposes reason-giving requirements on agencies fails to account for
established aspects of current law. Consider the Supreme Court's decision in
Camp v. Pitts, in which the Comptroller of Currency denied a bank charter.9"
The Court held that neither the APA's requirements for reason-giving nor the
enabling statute required the Comptroller to hold a hearing or make formal
findings as a basis for his action.96 The Comptroller, however, had provided a
brief basis for his conclusion in a letter. Despite the absence of procedural
reason-giving or fact-finding requirements, the Court held that the
Comptroller's action could be sustained only based on his own
contemporaneous finding. Citing Chenery I, it wrote that "[t]he validity of the
Comptroller's action must, therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that
finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate standard of review."97 The Court
reversed and remanded to the lower court with instructions to apply this
principle in reviewing the Comptroller's action.98 If the Chenery principle were
solely a product of the APA's reason-giving requirements, it would not apply
when the APA did not require contemporaneous reason-giving.
92. When the agency engages in informal rulemaking, the APA requires the agency to provide a
"concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose," 5 U.S.C. S 553(c) (2000), and
when the agency engages in formal adjudication or rulemaking, the APA requires the agency
to state "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
issues of fact, law, or discretion," id. § 557(c)(3)(A).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 ....
94. See sources cited supra note 78.
95. 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam).
96. See id. at 140-41.
97. Id. at 143.
98. Id.
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Grounding Chenery in the APA's judicial review provisions also requires
judicial embellishment. As noted above, the statute sets forth broad substantive
standards for review of agency action, such as the arbitrary and capricious
standard, and it establishes when judicial review is available.99 But those
provisions are silent on the particular concern of the Chenery principle: whether
an agency may be affirmed on grounds other than those it invoked at the time.
In principle, a court could evaluate whether an agency's action was arbitrary
and capricious by assessing the agency's outcomes without reference to the
stated grounds of the action. As suggested above, it is the conjunction of the
Chenery principle with this substantive standard that confines the reviewing
court's attention to the way the agency justified its decision at the time it was
made. The fact that in contemporary administrative law the Chenery principle
is viewed as an aspect of hard look review does not show that Chenery is
grounded in the arbitrary and capricious standard; it shows only that the
arbitrary and capricious standard has been applied in combination with
Chenery.
The point here is not to deny that Chenery could be viewed as an element of
the judicial enforcement of these APA provisions. Arguments could certainly be
made that Chenery helps to enforce them and that the Chenery principle is and
should be associated with them. The question, however, is whether the Chenery
principle's grounding is ultimately tied to the APA or has more general
foundations. The burden of the arguments I offer in Part III is to show that
there are more general foundations for the Chenery principle - foundations that
may help to explain its role in APA review. But it should come as no surprise
that when the APA is at work, it will be difficult to discern whether the APA or
Chenery's broader foundations drive the principle.
B. As Necessary to Judicial Review or Article III
Another approach is to justify the Cheney principle as an element of
judicial review itself or as an aspect of the Article III limitations on the federal
courts' power. A court-based rationale was prominent in Cheney I: "[T]he
courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the
considerations underlying the action under review." '° As the Court elaborated,
"[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds
upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately
99. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (specifying the right of review); id. § 706 (establishing standards
of review).
100. 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
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sustained." ' Numerous decisions embrace these claims that the principle is
necessary to judicial review or to its "orderly functioning" in the administrative
process.'02
But the basic suggestion-that considering the reasons invoked to justify
an action is a necessary condition for reviewing the action-is odd. Consider
constitutional review of legislation. In the run-of-the-mill case, judicial review
of legislation does not exclude post hoc justifications. Likewise, as noted above,
appellate courts review trial court decisions without imposing a Chenery
principle. In these cases, judicial review proceeds by reviewing outcomes,
without necessary recourse to the reasons invoked by the initial decision-
maker. The justification that the Chenery principle is necessary for judicial
review is too general. If true, this justification would require applying the
principle across the board and could not explain the confinement of the
Chenery principle to review of agency action.
Perhaps, then, there is something peculiar to the "orderly functioning" of
the process of judicial review of administrative action that requires the Chenery
principle, even if it is not required for judicial review in general. On that view,
the explanation for the differential application of Chenery would lie not in
features intrinsic to the process of review itself, but instead in the institutional
relationships among courts, agencies, and the legislature. In that case, it makes
more sense to explain the difference directly with reference to those
institutional relationships and not as an aspect of the process of review.
The idea that the Chenery principle embodies an Article III limitation on the
judiciary has similar failings. The core of the Article III position is this: for a
court to select the rationale upon which the agency's action will be sustained-
as opposed to evaluating the soundness of the rationale the agency articulated
at the time it acted-would amount to the judicial assumption of an
"administrative" or even quasi-legislative function that exceeds the Article III
powers of federal courts." 3
101. Id.
102. E.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962) ("For the courts
to substitute their or counsel's discretion for that of the Commission is incompatible with
the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review."); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 428 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (citing
Burlington); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249 (1972) (same); Inv. Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971) (same); Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir.
2000) (citing the "orderly functioning" rationale).
iO3. See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Gloomy World ofludge
Smith, 1986 DuKE L.J. 258,274 n.81 (describing the underdeveloped Article III doctrine).
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The invocation of such a limitation on the judicial power finds some
support in cases from the 1930s and earlier, but it has been largely overlooked
or cast aside in contemporary constitutional law." 4 Even were this limitation to
flourish, however, it too would leave little room to explain constitutional
review of legislation. If selecting the rationale for agency action would exceed
the judicial power, then wouldn't the same be true of selecting the rationale
that justifies an act of Congress? This is a clear stumbling block for an Article
III account. Of course, Chenery may help to enforce a limitation on the power
exercised by courts, but that limitation appears to be a by-product of, as
opposed to the basic ground for, the Chenery principle.
C. As a Principle of Deference (and Delegation)
The most helpful conventional theory of the Chenery principle turns more
expressly to Congress's structuring of the judicial role in reviewing agency
104. As Levin has noted, the prospect that a form of judicial review may exceed the boundaries of
Article III by taking on an "administrative" function is clearly illustrated by Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930). See Levin, supra note 103, at 274 n.81.
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order of the D.C. Court of Appeals,
the highest non-Article III court in the District of Columbia, because the statute granted the
D.C. court an administrative, not a judicial, role. See Gen. Elec., 281 U.S. at 466-67. The
statute provided the Federal Radio Commission with the authority to grant and to revoke a
radio license under a broad public convenience, interest, or necessity standard, see id., and
granted the D.C. court authority to review the Commission's order, to hear additional
evidence, and to revise the Commission's order and "enter such judgment as to it may seem
just," id. at 467.
The Supreme Court held that the powers granted to the D.C. court were "purely
administrative," in the sense that they made the D.C. court into "a superior and revising
agency in the same field." Id. Because the D.C. court was a non-Article III tribunal, Congress
could vest it with such administrative powers. But the Supreme Court held that it would
exceed the Court's own Article III powers to take jurisdiction over an appeal from this
administrative decision. See id. at 468-69. The Court "cannot give decisions which are
merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative." Id. at 469. This idea of an Article III limitation on
judicial engagement in "essentially legislative or administrative" functions has little hold, at
least in its express form, in contemporary constitutional law, see Levin, supra note 103, at 274
n.8i, though it might be reflected in recent decisions that have denied judicial review for lack
of judicially manageable standards, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARv. L. REV.
1274 (2006); see also Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1ool, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from summary affirmance without opinion) (suggesting that an act granting the
district court jurisdiction to approve a civil antitrust settlement is without a standard and
thus may not "admit[] of resolution by a court exercising the judicial power established by
Art. III of the Constitution").
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action. This account suggests that the principle is an aspect of judicial respect
for the authority that Congress has delegated to the agency.
Chenery sets out the following reasoning:
If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which
the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a
judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative
judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders,
an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has
exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.10 5
In numerous decisions, the Court has reiterated the view that applying the
Chenery principle "is not to deprecate, but to vindicate the administrative
process, for the purpose of the rule is to avoid 'propel[ling] the court into the
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative
agency.
This suggestion is initially counterintuitive: how can it be that reversing the
agency for acting on reasons that are not sustainable is more respectful or
deferential to the agency than affirming the agency action for reasons that the
agency did not express but that its counsel has argued? °7
One promising place to start is with the idea that Congress has granted the
agency, not the court, exclusive power to determine the basis of the agency's
actions. The Chenery Court's analogy to the jury suggests this view. The Court
noted that "where the correctness of the lower court's decision depends upon a
105. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 88; see also id. at 94 ("We do not intend to enter the province that
belongs to the Board, nor do we do so." (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 197 (1941))).
io6. Burlington, 371 U.S. at 169 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Chenery II, 332
U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); see also INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (denying that
an "appellate court [could] intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively
entrusted to an administrative agency" (alteration in original) (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S.
at 88)); Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333 (1983) (quoting the "propel" language of
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196); Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 249 (quoting Burlington); Inv.
Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 628 ("Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to
appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.");
Fed. Power Comm'n v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U.S. 71, 73 (1968) (quoting the
"propel" language of Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196).
107. The corollary of this rule, as Levin has suggested, is that "a court also may not reject an
agency action by making its own determinations on an issue that lies within the agency's
discretionary authority." Levin, supra note 82, at 367-68. This is a shorthand statement of
the basic principle of judicial deference to agencies' determination of matters within their
province.
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determination of fact which only a jury could make but which has not been
made, the appellate court cannot take the place of the jury. " 'Os It then stated
that "[1]ike considerations" applied to review of administrative orders."°9 By
making a finding of fact, a court of appeals would exceed its institutional role
(review) by usurping a function of the jury (initial fact-finding); when a jury
trial occurs, the jury, not the appeals court, has exclusive dominion over fact-
finding.
For the analogy between usurpation of the jury's role and the Chenery
principle to hold, the power to select the rationale for an agency's action must
be understood as an essential element of that action, a matter over which the
agency has exclusive power. On that understanding, for a court to substitute or
supply reasons for the agency action would amount not to a form of deference
to the agency, but rather to a usurpation of the agency's role. That appears to
be the implied understanding in the Court's suggestion that the Chenery
principle prevents courts from "intrud[ing] upon the domain which Congress
has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency."" Thus, the Chenery
principle can be seen as embodying respect for the agency based on the premise
that Congress has granted the agency the exclusive power to select the rationale
for its own actions.
On this delegation theory, the grant of substantive discretion to the agency
also vests the agency with the power to select the reasons for its actions; the
delegation, on this view, is a grant of authority to take actions for reasons that
the agency expressly endorses, not merely to take actions. At a basic level, this
seems to be an appealing understanding of the character of congressional
delegation. Part of the reason for the delegation, after all, is for the agency to
exercise its expertise.
One difficulty, however, is that when Congress delegates authority to
agencies, it rarely indicates an intent that courts police the agencies' exercise of
authority through the Chenery rule of review. Thus, this delegation view would
have to take the Chenery principle as a presumption about the conditions that
Congress aims to impose when it grants substantive discretion to the agency.
Viewed this way, the delegation theory has a strong similarity to the Chevron
doctrine, which also relies upon a presumption -indeed, a concededly fictive
presumption"'- of congressional intent. For Chevron, the presumption is that
1o8. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 88.
1o9. Id.
iio. Id.; see also Louis v. Dep't of Labor, 419 F. 3 d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2005).
m. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REv.
771, 792 (2002) (noting wide agreement that Chevron relies on a fiction concerning
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the grant of authority to bind with the force of law also carries with it a grant of
interpretive authority.' 2 On the delegation theory of Chenety, the parallel
presumption is that the grant of substantive authority carries with it the
exclusive power to select the reasons that can be relied upon to justify the
action.
For some, this might be the right place to rest in the search for a
justification of Chenery. Emphasizing that the principle is founded on a
presumption about Congress's intent in delegating power to the agency seems
to make sense of the courts' persistent claim that Chenery expresses deference to
the agency. It also conveys the background assumption that Congress delegates
in part so that agencies will exercise their expertise and flexibility in view of
changing conditions, and it suggests that Chenery provides a way to ensure that
the agencies will do so.
But there are reasons not to stop here. The delegation theory, as explicated
thus far, links the Chenery principle to a presumption about how Congress
would want courts to review agency action. Other than the basic idea that
Congress grants agencies authority because of their expertise and
responsiveness, we do not yet have reasons of principle or policy for making
this uphold-only-for-reasons-given presumption about Congress's
intentions.11 Further, the delegation theory provides only a thin explanation of
what would be so terribly wrong with a court's defying the Chenery principle
and affirming for post hoc reasons. A fuller understanding of why courts
construe delegations as including such an implied condition on the grounds for
review may help to explain what interests the Chenery principle protects.
III. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND THE CHENERY PRINCIPLE
The previous Part argued that neither the APA alone, nor the process of
judicial review, nor Article III grounds the Chenety principle. It suggested that
the inquiry should focus instead on the idea that the demands of Chenery stem
from the delegation of authority to the agency. This Part argues that the
nondelegation doctrine provides a basis for courts to read the Chenery
Congress's intent to allocate interpretive authority); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871-72 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 ("[A]ny rule
adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent .....
112. See infra text accompanying notes 247-250.
113. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. CT. REV.
201, 203, 223 (arguing that policy judgments should inform presumptions of congressional
intentions about Chevron's application).
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principle, at least as a default rule of statutory construction, into delegations of
authority to act with the force of law.
The nondelegation doctrine enforces the constitutional limitation on
Congress's authority to give away its powers to other entities. This limitation is
generally attributed to the Constitution's provision in Article I, Section 1 that
"[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress."114 My
core suggestion is that the Chenery principle supplements the enforcement of
the nondelegation doctrine as it is currently formulated. This Part first
identifies the aspect of the nondelegation doctrine that the Chenery principle
enforces and then articulates the values that such enforcement promotes.
A. Two Arms ofNondelegation
To the contemporary ear, it may sound peculiar that the Chenery principle
operates as a mode of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine. After all, the
current (and now conventional) formulation of the nondelegation doctrine says
nothing about reason-giving; rather, it requires Congress to "lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [act] is directed to conform." '
To see the aspect of the nondelegation doctrine that Chenery enforces
requires digging back into the context in which the intelligible principle
formulation emerged. Doing so reveals that the intelligible principle
requirement arose as part of a nondelegation doctrine that had two demands,
not one: a requirement of a standard to guide agency action under the
delegation (the focus of the intelligible principle formulation and its related
enforcement regimes) and a requirement that the agency exercising the
authority expressly state the grounds upon which its action is premised. It is
this second requirement, which formed part of the "contingency" theory of
nondelegation, that the Chenery principle implements. 
16
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § i; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2097, 2104 (2004) (reporting that
the nondelegation doctrine is now firmly tied to Article I, Section 1).
11S. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
16. It should be noted that grounding Chenery in the nondelegation doctrine, with its reliance
on a distinction between congressional and administrative action, puts Chenery at
loggerheads with Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). Pacific States
Box embraced a vision of judicial review of administrative action in which the "presumption
of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes, . . . and to
orders of administrative bodies." Id. at 186. As the current state of the Chenery doctrine
shows, the vision of judicial review of agency action reflected in Pacific States Box has not
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i. Intelligible Principles in Context
In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court marked the distinction
between valid and invalid delegations on the basis of whether the legislation
predicated the agency's (or often the President's) power to act with binding
effect on a finding that a "named contingency" had occurred. "7
Field v. Clark provides a classic statement of the contingency theory of
delegation. The legislation at issue granted the President the power to suspend
tariff-free imports from a given country and to impose legislatively specified
tariffs instead, if the President "deem[ed]" that tariff-free trade with the
country would be "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable."" 8 After reciting
examples of legislation that made the suspension of specified provisions, or the
operation of others, depend on "the action of the President based upon the
occurrence of subsequent events,"" 9 the Court reasoned that because the
President's power was predicated on the declaration of certain conditions, the
statute did not improperly grant "legislative" authority. 2 "Legislative power,"
the Court stated, "was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension
should take effect upon a named contingency.. 21 Rather than exercising
legislative power, which involved questions of "expediency and just operation,"
the Court reasoned that the President was merely executing the law by
declaring "the event upon which [Congress's] expressed will was to take
effect. '
The Supreme Court's enforcement of the contingency theory of delegation
took a procedural turn. In particular, the Court treated an agency's failure to
carried the day, though some advocate its return. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 95 (1995) (urging courts to reverse the
judicially enforced demand for reasoned decision-making and to embrace the Pacific States
Box approach).
117. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892). See generally JERRY L. MAHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE 132-33 (1997) (discussing the contingency theory); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, lo9
YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 & n.24, 1404 (2000) (same); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 481-88 (1989)
(providing an account of early nondelegation decisions).
i18. Field, 143 U.S. at 68o (quoting Tariff Act of 189o, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612).
9ig. Id. at 683; see also id. at 683-92 (compiling statutes of this character).
i2o. See id. at 692-93.
121. Id. at 693.
122. Id. As Professor Jerry Mashaw has noted, the Field contingency theory is logical, but it
requires one to believe, "counterfactually[,] that whether a tariff is 'unreasonable' is a
question of fact rather than a political judgment." MASAW, supra note 117, at 132.
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make a finding of the predicate contingency as a violation of constitutional
principles that could not be remedied by post hoc averments, not merely as a
violation of the statutory requirement to make such predicate determinations.
The Court demanded that the official state the grounds for his actions even in
the absence of a statutory requirement to do so, thus treating the requirement
as a default rule of statutory construction.
The Court's decision in Mahler v. Eby'23 is illustrative of this line of
authority. In Mahler, the Court rejected the argument that an immigration
statute's "undesirable residents of the United States" standard was too broad a
standard for determining which eligible persons were deportable,1" but it
reversed the Secretary of Labor's orders of deportation on the grounds that the
orders did not include express findings of those circumstances. 2 s Relying
extensively on its prior decision in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,26 the Court emphasized that a valid delegation must
constrain the power granted by imposing prescribed procedures: "In creating
such an administrative agency the legislature, to prevent its being a pure
delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of
procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function."'27
The Court read the statute as requiring a finding by the Secretary as a
condition precedent to deportation and held that the validity of the Secretary's
order "must rest upon the needed finding.1
8
Indeed, the Court expressly embraced the rule in Wichita Railroad that "the
lack of an express finding [could not] be supplied by implication" or by
reference to litigation documents before the agency, concluding that such a
defect "goes to the existence of the power on which the proceeding rests." 9
And, as in Wichita Railroad, the Court in Mahler based its conclusion that the
lack of findings regarding the contingency conditions was fatal to the validity
of the Secretary's action not only "on the language of the statute, but also on
general principles of constitutional government." 3' Thus we see the Court
enforcing the contingency theory of delegation in a very specific fashion: when
the specification of contingency conditions is necessary to the constitutional
123. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
124. Id. at 40-41 (quoting Act of May 1o, 1920, ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593, 593 (repealed 1952)).
125. See id. at 41-44.
126. 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
127. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 44 (quoting Wichita R.R., 26o U.S. at S9).
izs. Id. at 43-45 (quoting Wichita R.R., 26o U.S. at 59).
129. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
13o. Id. at 44.
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validity of the statute, the agency must make a determination that those
conditions are present in order for its action to be constitutionally valid; that
determination cannot be supplied by the agency in litigation or by the
reviewing court.'31
While the Court enforced the contingency theory by requiring the agency
to make an express statement that it found the contingency-and declining to
find such statements by implication-it exercised little scrutiny of how much
discretion was afforded by the statute's articulation of the contingency. For
instance, the Court upheld statutes that broadly defined the contingency to
include determining who were the "undesirable residents of the United
States," '32 finding that utility rates were "unjust, unreasonable, unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential," '133 and deeming tariffs "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable.' 34 Each of these contingencies is effectively a broad
standard for when the agency could trigger the authority granted by the
statute. And the Court later expressly characterized the doctrine as permitting
Congress not only to specify factual predicates for executive action, but also to
establish primary standards for invoking the powers delegated.13
131. Cf Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 448 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("If legislative
power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional government
that the condition be fulfilled. In default of such fulfilment, there is in truth no delegation,
and hence no official action, but only the vain show of it.").
132. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40 (quoting Act of May io, 1920, ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593, 593 (repealed
1952)).
133. Wichita R.R., 260 U.S. at 55 (quoting An Act Relating to Public Utilities and Common
Carriers, ch. 238, § 43, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 417, 436).
134. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 68o (1892) (quoting Tariff Act of 189o, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat.
567, 612).
135. See Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 426 ("Congress may not only give such authorizations to
determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the
duty to carry out the declared legislative policy .... "); see also Fed. Radio Comm'n v.
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933) (affirming the requirement
that the Radio Commission make decisions to grant licenses "as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires" (quoting Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 84 (1932) (repealed
1934))); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 20 n.1 (1932) (approving the
delegation to the ICC to determine whether "acquisition ... by one . . . carrier[] of the
control of any other such carrier . . . will be in the public interest" (quoting Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1926) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11,323-11,326
(2000)))); Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 129 (1924) (upholding the requirement that
the ICC determine when there is a "shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic or other
emergency requiring immediate action" in deciding whether to suspend railway car service
under the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 476); Monongahela Bridge Co. v.
United States, 216 U.S. 177, 185-86 (191o); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364,
366 (1907); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 494-96 (1904).
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It was against this background- requiring the agency to make express
statements that the statutory contingencies or conditions were satisfied, but
with little scrutiny of how much discretion the stated conditions or
contingencies granted-that the Court articulated the "intelligible principle"
requirement in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.136 In Hampton, the
Supreme Court upheld an act that granted authority to the President to adjust
tariff rates if he found that the duties specified in the legislation did not
equalize the differences in the cost of production of goods in other countries. 37
The contingency theory framed the Court's analysis. The Hampton Court
began by noting that Congress had frequently found it necessary to repose in
an executive officer the determination of when the conditions specified in an
act had occurred. 138 As in Field, the Court held that the statute at issue merely
permitted the President to declare the occurrence of the contingency from
which the legislative consequences would follow. 39 The Court proffered the
intelligible principle formulation as a response to a potential counterargument
that these general principles did not apply to a delegation of rate-setting
authority: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."1 40 In
Hampton itself, the intelligible principle formulation did not displace, but
rather supplemented, the contingency theory.
The Supreme Court's decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan141 most
clearly embraces these two strands of nondelegation operating alongside each
other. In Panama Refining, the Court struck down, on nondelegation grounds,
section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 42 as well as the
President's orders (and those of his subdelegates) under the Act. 43
The Court framed the analysis of the nondelegation challenge as "whether
the Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the
Congress has set up a standard for the President's action; [and] whether the
136. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
137. See id. at 401-02 (quoting Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 5 315(a), (c), 42 Stat. 858, 941-43
(repealed 1930)).
138. Id. at 407.
139. See id. at 410-11.
140. Id. at 409.
141. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
142. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Star. 195, 200 (1933), invalidated by Pan.
Ref., 293 U.S. 388.
143. See 293 U.S. at 414-33.
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Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the
authority to enact the prohibition." '  The Court's analysis collapsed the first
two elements, leaving the nondelegation inquiry with two parts-whether
Congress had declared a policy or standard, and whether the Act required the
President to state the predicate grounds for his action under the statute.
In the most familiar passages in Panama Refining, the Court concluded that
section 9(c) and its surrounding statutory context did not provide a sufficient
standard or policy to guide the President's exercise of discretion to prohibit the
transportation of oil withdrawn in violation of state law' 45: "Congress has
declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is
no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the
transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.'
' 4 6
But the constitutional infirmities did not end there. The Court concluded
that the President's executive orders under the Act were constitutionally invalid
because they included no statement of the predicate grounds for his actions.14
The Court reasoned that even if it were possible to ascertain the prerequisites
for the President's action under section 9(c), "it would still be necessary for the
President to comply with those conditions and to show that compliance as the
ground of his prohibition."148
After emphasizing that the President must articulate a finding for the
constraints on delegation to be effectual, the Court rebutted the suggestion
that judicial review of the President's actions was unavailable. On the contrary,
the Court noted that when a citizen may be punished for the crime of violating
such a "legislative order of an executive officer," due process of law requires
that the order be authorized and that the basis for the executive officer's
determinations be stated. 49 The Court then specifically embraced Mahler and
144. Id. at 415.
145. See id. at 414-20.
146. Id. at 430.
147. See id. at 431-32.
148. Id. at 431.
149. Id. at 432. One might object that it is due process of law, not the requirements of the
nondelegation doctrine, that grounds the express statement requirement. On this view, the
express statement requirement might provide grounds for Chenery itself- an adjudication -
and even for the requirement's application to adjudications more generally, but not justify
its application to agency rulemaking, which generally does not trigger due process
protections. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935). While
Panama Refining, Mahler, and Wichita Railroad did involve adjudication against individual
entities, which raises due process concerns, each decision embraced the express statement
requirement as part of its analysis of delegation. See Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 431-32; Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 42-46 (1924); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S.
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Wichita Railroad, reaffirming that the failure of the official to make express
findings violates principles of constitutional government and that such a failure
cannot be overcome "by implication."' °
Panama Refining, moreover, concluded that the President's action was
constitutionally invalid for lack of a finding despite the fact that the statute did
not expressly require one."' The Court thus treated the express statement
requirement as necessary to the validity of the statute, a background default
rule of construction required by "the constitutional restriction applicable to
such a delegation."" 2 It was then easy work to conclude that the President
failed to satisfy the requirement. That failure of articulation, like the failure of
an agency to do the same, rendered the President's executive order "without
constitutional authority."'' 3
48, 58-59 (1922). And in Panama Refining, in which the Court linked due process to the
requirement that the official's "determinations must be shown," Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 432, it
did so in the context of addressing the availability of judicial review of a legislative order
that imposed criminal liability, and within its larger nondelegation analysis, see id. at 431-32.
Finally, to the extent that the nondelegation doctrine and the due process protections both
aim to check arbitrary government action, it makes sense that their application and
requirements may overlap. For a discussion of the connection between the nondelegation
doctrine and due process of law, including these decisions, see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1553-56 (1991).
150. Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 433 (quoting Wichita R.R., 260 U.S. at 59); see also supra text
accompanying notes 123-131 (discussing Mahler). Indeed, these violations of the contingency
theory, not the Court's holding that the Act was invalid for failure to supply a sufficient
standard, may best explain the grounds upon which the decision turned. Unlike section 3 of
the NIRA, which was struck down in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935), for lack of a sufficient standard to guide the President's discretion, the powers
granted in section 9(c) cabined the President's discretion. Section 3 of the NIRA granted the
President power to approve and modify "codes of fair competition" proposed by industry
groups, National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, % 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196-97 (1933), invalidated
by Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495, but contained none of section 9(c)'s limitations on the
President's power, see supra text accompanying note 142. Justice Cardozo explained his own
decision to dissent in Panama Refining and to join the Court in Schechter Poultry on precisely
these grounds. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 551-54 (Cardozo, J., concurring); Pan. Ref.,
293 U.S. at 434-37 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 9 contained a sufficient
standard and limit on the scope of the discretion granted to the President).
151. See Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 406; see also id. at 448 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
analogy to Mahler and Wichita Railroad was not appropriate because in those cases, the
power granted to the President was not "so conditioned" on a finding).
152. Id. at 433 (majority opinion); see also id. at 420 ("The question whether such a delegation of
legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it
should be assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for what he believes to be the
public good .... While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the
basic question has a much wider application.").
153. Id. at 433.
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We see, then, a nondelegation doctrine with at least two operating
elements. The doctrine polices the scope of the discretion Congress may give
away by specifying standards that must be satisfied before the agency may
invoke the authority granted. That is the concern of the intelligible principle
formulation. But the doctrine also requires the agency to make an express
statement of the basis for its action under those standards, even when the
statute does not itself expressly require such a statement. Both aspects are, of
course, connected. Prescribing conditions under which the agency may invoke
its authority does little work without some oversight of agency claims that the
predicate conditions are satisfied. 4 Likewise, merely requiring a public
statement of the grounds for an agency action makes little sense without
standards with which to evaluate those grounds.
2. Enforcement and Underenforcement
Since the Supreme Court's 1935 decisions in Panama Refining and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States' invalidating different provisions of the
same statute, the Court has steadfastly declined to invalidate legislative
delegation on nondelegation grounds.' s6 The focus of the familiar story of this
nonenforcement has been the intelligible principle element of the
nondelegation doctrine. By the time of Whitman v. American TruckingAss'ns,157
and considerably before, the Court presented the intelligible principle
formulation as a complete statement of the nondelegation doctrine; the
doctrinal requirement that agencies and executive officers make express
statements of findings or grounds - so prominent in Panama Refining, Mahler,
and Wichita Railroad-had fallen by the wayside.' It is these express
1S4. Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring)
("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and courts have
upheld such delegation because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the
delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits
by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.").
155. 295 U.S. 495.
156. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 117; Manning, supra note 69; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315 (2000). The Court has been so permissive as to what counts
as an intelligible principle that most commentators have concluded that this formulation is
simply not enforced through constitutional review. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 114, at 2109
("[A]s far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the nondelegation doctrine imposes no
effective constraint on congressional legislation.").
157. 531 U.S. 457 (2OOl).
is8. See id. at 472. Compare Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 16o, 165-67 (1991) (invoking the
intelligible principle test, but also noting the statutory requirements of findings), Fed.
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statement demands of the nondelegation doctrine, however, that the Chenery
principle implements.
The Court's reluctance to enforce the intelligible principle doctrine is
frequently attributed to the fact that it invites the Court to "second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left
to those executing or applying the law. 159 In response to the reluctance to
engage in Marbury-style judicial review without a more manageable judicial
standard, courts and commentators have identified other guises through which
the nondelegation doctrine is enforced. 6o
Some have focused on alternative ways of enforcing the intelligible
principle test. The Supreme Court itself has professed that its predominant
mode of enforcing the intelligible principle doctrine has been through the
canon of constitutional avoidance.161 In this avoidance form, the Court adopts
narrowing constructions of a statutory delegation in order to avoid directly
Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 558-60 (1976) (noting the
requirement that the President find that preconditions specified in the legislative standard
have been met), and Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (invoking the
intelligible principle test but also noting that the statute required officials to act upon
findings of excessive profits), with Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484-87 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on the intelligible principle formulation and mentioning the
presidential determination only incidentally), Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771-73
(1996) (invoking the intelligible principle test without any mention of the need for
findings), Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-79 (1989) (treating the intelligible
principle test as a sufficient nondelegation test without any mention of the need for
findings), and Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-43 (1974)
(construing the statute narrowly to avoid directly confronting Hampton and Schechter
Poultry, without any mention of findings requirements).
159. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Manning, supra note 69, at 241-42
(noting the same).
160. Not everyone agrees that enforcement of anything resembling the traditional prohibition on
delegation is appropriate. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 114, at 2099, 2101 (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine should be replaced by the "exclusive delegation" doctrine that only
Congress may delegate legislative power); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721 (2002) (arguing that the only limitation on
delegation of legislative power is that members of Congress may not delegate their power to
vote on legislation or to exercise other powers of legislators).
161. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation
doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional."); Bressman, supra note 117, at 1409-11 (describing the
canon of avoidance and clear statement doctrines as surrogates for the nondelegation
doctrine); Manning, supra note 69, at 223, 242-45 (describing constitutional avoidance as the
exclusive mode of enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine); Merrill, supra note 114, at
2103 n.16 (collecting examples of enforcement through constitutional avoidance).
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determining whether the statute contains an intelligible principle.162 In
addition, Professor Lisa Bressman identified, as another guise for the
intelligible principle doctrine's enforcement, the requirement that agencies
themselves articulate standards that limit their discretion,163 such as those
imposed by the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA.
6 4
Others have suggested that the Court enforces the interests of the
intelligible principle formulation through doctrines of statutory interpretation
that aim to provide incentives for Congress to act. Professor Cass Sunstein, for
instance, has argued that doubts about judicial administrability suggest that
the intelligible principle doctrine is usefully supplemented by a wide array of
statutory construction canons that limit agency discretion or require clear
congressional statements. 65 In a similar vein, Professor John Manning has
suggested that the canon of reading general statutory directions in light of
more specific directions fuirthers nondelegation interests. 
66
This discussion about modes of enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine
has not, however, given sustained attention to the contingency theory's
requirement that agencies must state the predicate conditions justifying their
invocation of the statute, nor has it attended to the ways in which the Chenery
principle operates to enforce this express statement aspect of the nondelegation
doctrine.
The parallels between Chenery and this aspect of the nondelegation doctrine
are quite striking. Both doctrines specify the source and timing of the
justification for the agency's actions. In particular, under both Chenery and the
162. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (198o) ("A
construction of the statute that avoids [an] open-ended grant [of legislative power] should
certainly be favored."); Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 341-43 (adopting a narrowing
construction of a statute based on the principle of constitutional avoidance); Manning, supra
note 69, at 242-43 ("Where a statute is broad enough to raise serious concerns under the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court simply cuts it back to acceptable bounds.").
163. Bressman, supra note 117, at 1415. Bressman has also identified the enforcement of standards
through constitutional avoidance as such a guise. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining
Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 454 (2002)
(arguing that using constitutional avoidance to implement administrative standards
requirements is a preferred mqde of enforcing nondelegation concerns following American
Trucking). Requiring an agency to set standards is one component of requiring it to explain
the bases for its actions. See id. at 464.
164. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3 d 1027, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding to the
agency to articulate an intelligible principle to guide its implementation of the statute), rev'd
in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2OOl).
16S. See Sunstein, supra note 156, at 316.
166. See Manning, supra note 69, at 267-76.
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express statement doctrine, the agency's statement of the grounds for its action
is a necessary predicate to the exercise of delegated authority. Both doctrines
expressly prohibit the agency from evading those requirements by having
another institution, such as a court, supply the necessary justification by
implication, or by having the agency's own counsel do so in the process of
litigation, as opposed to at the time of the agency's action. Moreover, as to the
types of justifications to which these doctrines apply, the express statement
aspect of the contingency theory is not more narrowly concerned with the
factual grounding of agency action than is the Chenery principle. Recall that the
Supreme Court routinely upheld statutes with predicate "contingencies"
involving broad standards of reasonableness or the public interest, not just the
determination of specific facts. 6' As a result, the contingency theory operated
as a requirement of an express statement of the predicate grounds for executive
or agency action; the Chenery principle does the same. While the express
statement aspect of traditional nondelegation doctrine has slipped from the
constitutional doctrine, the Chenery principle actively enforces it. The familiar
story of underenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine is thus incomplete; it
is really a story about the underenforcement of the intelligible principle
requirement, not the entire doctrine.
B. Chenery and Nondelegation Values
The discussion of the nondelegation doctrine thus far has sought to locate
the intelligible principle requirement in the context in which it arose and to
expose an aspect of the doctrine-the contingency theory's express statement
requirement- that has been obscured, at least as a matter of express
constitutional doctrine, and that the Chenery principle enforces. But what
values does this enforcement promote? A strong argument can be made that
the Chenery principle's implementation of the express statement requirement
provides support for the constellation of values served by the nondelegation
doctrine-promoting political accountability of decision-making as well as
nonarbitrariness and regularity.
68
167. See supra text accompanying notes 132-135.
168. Along the way, these arguments may suggest, though perhaps decades late, that there is
more to the express statement enforcement of the contingency theory than might initially
appear.
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1. Democratic Accountability
One of the central values invoked to justify the nondelegation doctrine in
general is promoting political accountability of decision-making. Proponents of
a strictly enforced nondelegation doctrine claim that this value tips decidedly in
their favor. 69 Defenders of broad delegations claim that such delegations
improve the accountability and responsiveness of government. 17' Whether one
understands accountability as the extent to which the decision-maker can be
"monitored and controlled," or as the connection between the decision-maker
and the people,1 71 the Chenery principle promotes agency accountability. The
Chenery prohibition promotes conditions for political control and monitoring
of the regulatory process in several different respects. At a basic level, the
prohibition provides a structural assurance that the grounds for agency policy
have been embraced by the most politically responsive and public actors within
the agency-whether a single administrator or a commission. 72 This concern is
evident in one of the Court's repeated refrains on Chenery: "Congress has
delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the
responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands. '1 73 While
agency administrators have general control over the arguments that the
agency's own appellate lawyers make, allowing courts to select post hoc
169. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77-78,
132 (1980).
170. See, e.g., MAsHAw, supra note 117, at 147-56 (exposing several ways in which agencies that
operate under broad delegations may be more democratically responsive than those that
operate under specific legislation); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-97 (1985). See generally Merrill,
supra note 114, at 2141-42 (discussing proponents and opponents of the idea that
nondelegation promotes accountability, and arguing that the term "accountability" is
ambiguous); Sunstein, supra note 156, at 319-20 (describing democratic accountability as
one of the main concerns of proponents of the "conventional" nondelegation doctrine).
171. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1127,
1181 (2000) (distinguishing these two conceptions of accountability).
172. See Krent, supra note 53, at 200.
173. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 245-50 (1972) (relying on the same rationale as a basis for a Chenery remand);
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962) (declining "to
substitute [its own] or counsel's discretion for that of the [agency]"); Church of Scientology
v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("If courts were to
accept an agency counsel's position that significantly differed from the agency's position,
they would in effect substitute a judicial interpretation for the agency's.").
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rationales would blur the lines of political responsibility.174 If a court selected a
validating basis for the agency's action that the agency itself had not
articulated, then the grounds for the White House, Congress, and the public to
hold the agency administrator or commission responsible for the rationale
would be diminished. Chenery thus promotes conditions for agency officials to
be held responsible for their positions and generally enforces the idea that
those in whom Congress has vested authority have independent discretion to
articulate reasons for their actions, not a discretion that can be supplanted by
the intervention of the courts, or otherwise, such as by the President. 175
The Chenery principle also protects the conditions for political checks on
agency decision-making that occur during the process of developing policy. A
fundamental feature of the American administrative state is that the President
may exert substantial influence over agency policy. With respect to executive
agencies, the President's power of nomination and power to remove executive
officials at will provide a structural assurance of substantial presidential
control. For these agencies, the President's regulatory review executive orders,
which require extensive agency consultation with and disclosure to the White
House, reinforce presidential monitoring and influence over administrative
agencies' major activities.176 Within the process of regulatory review, for
instance, the White House (acting through the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), as part of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)) can return a proposed regulation to an agency and require it to alter
the rationale upon which it relied."z Recent empirical work also suggests that a
174. That blurring becomes even more prominent when the rationale is furnished by the
Solicitor General's office in representing the agency before the Supreme Court. While the
agency lawyers have opportunities to influence the Solicitor General's office, they do not
directly control the representation. As a result, if the Court upheld an agency's action on
grounds proffered by the Solicitor General before the Court, the connection between the
rationale and the agency would be even more attenuated. See Krent, supra note 53, at 204
n.29 (noting a possible difference between the Solicitor General's arguments and the views
of agency heads).
17S. See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 1o6 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 322 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2007) (manuscript at 6, 1o-
14), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=949649.
176. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258,
3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).
177. See id. § 6(b)(3) (specifying OIRA's right to return significant agency regulations); see, e.g.,
Letter from John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Executive Office
of the President, to Kay Cole James, Dir., Office of Pers. Mgmt. i (Dec. 18, 2002),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/retur/opmreturnletter.pdf (returning a proposed
regulation to an agency based on "significant concerns with the justification for the
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wide array of White House offices and officials assert influence and exercise
checks on agencies throughout the regulatory process. T17 If a court were to
uphold an agency's action on a basis not articulated by the agency at the time it
acted, it could be selecting a ground that was rejected by the executive
oversight officials in the process of regulatory review. That type of affirmance
would undermine the political control exerted over agency action during the
review process. 179
Even with regard to an independent agency over which the President has
less direct influence, the transparency of the agency's decision-making
process -enforced by many of the APA's procedural requirements for
rulemaking or formal adjudication -allows both executive branch officials and
the public to consider and respond to the agency's proposed course of action
and to challenge the agency's premises and findings. While the general agency
process applicable to both independent and executive agencies is far from
perfect, it enforces public disclosure and the opportunity for public response at
multiple levels. Notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings, for instance,
require the agency to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that references the
legal authority and substance of the rule,sO to disclose the scientific basis for
the rule in order to allow adequate opportunity to comment," ' to provide an
opportunity for interested persons to comment, and to issue a statement of
basis and purpose."s2 Part of what these procedures do is make public, over an
extended period of time, the agency's development of its position, thus
allowing interested parties to comment on the proposed rule and to seek mid-
course revisions.
The same transparency and process protections do not apply to agency
counsel, the Solicitor General, or DOJ lawyers in their choice of argument to
defend an agency action. By prohibiting grounds other than those relied upon
by the agency, the Chenery doctrine provides an assurance that the grounds
proposed alternative" and the failure to "explain why the existing cost principles are not
sufficient").
178. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
179. The Supreme Court's decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), curtails the extent to which judicial constructions
would also constrain the agency's future action under the statute. In Brand X, the Court held
that agencies are not bound to prior judicial constructions of ambiguities or gaps in statutes
that the agencies administer.
i8o. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
181. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
182. See S U.S.C. 5 553(c).
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upon which the agency's action will be evaluated have been exposed to the
public light. Chenery thus insists that timing matters; it makes the validity of
agency action in part a matter of the agency's prior public statements and the
opportunity for such statements to attract the attention of the executive,
Congress, and the public. And because the agency officials are not directly
elected, the very ways in which the Chenery principle promotes political
monitoring and control also augment the connection between the agency
official and the electorate.
The Chenety principle's contributions to political monitoring and control
are distinct from those of the intelligible principle doctrine. In theory, that
doctrine ensures a statutory standard against which agency action can be
judged. This safeguard provides one condition for agency monitoring, but it
does not help to monitor agencies during the process of implementing
statutory directives. The Chenery principle, in contrast, does just that by
ensuring that the grounds of agency action can be attributed to accountable
officers of the agency and are available for evaluation by the executive branch
and the public during the process of policy formation.
2. Nonarbitrariness and the Rule of Law
Promoting rule of law values is also a core purpose of the nondelegation
doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine aims to protect against arbitrary agency
decision-making and to promote regularity, rationality, and transparency.
Professor Kenneth Davis championed nonarbitrariness as a principal aim of the
nondelegation doctrine, 8 ' and other commentators have elaborated on this
focus,1 s4 with its ready connection to the Supreme Court's decision in Schechter
Poultry. 8s As Professor Peter Strauss has written, a basic purpose of the
nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that the agency is prepared "to justify its
behavior to outside assessors in accordance with principles of regularity andlegality.186
The Chenery reason-giving principle directly promotes these rule-of-law
values. At a basic level, it requires agencies to engage in a practice of reason-
183. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 2o8 (2d ed. 1978).
184. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 117, at 1424-31; Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule
of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427, 441-44 (1989).
185. 295 U.S. 495, 539-42 (1935) (striking down section 3 of the NIRA as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power for granting the President the authority to amend proposed
codes "as he pleases").
186. Strauss, supra note 184, at 443.
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giving to justify their outcomes. A practice of reason-giving, as Professor
Frederick Schauer has explained, involves several closely related commitments;
reasons have the logical structure of "propositions of greater generality than
the conclusions they are reasons for.",17 A reason, by virtue of being more
general, will include the basis for its own conclusion and more. 88 "Because it is
good to write thank-you notes" is a reason that includes more than the basis
only for the particular note written, and "because it is good to show
appreciation" is an even more general step. 89 When we give a reason for an
action, that reason-giving creates a "prima facie commitment to other
outcomes falling within [the] scope" of the reason. 90 This is not to say that a
decision-maker can never depart from the outcomes that fall within the scope
of a reason previously offered, but rather that once the decision-maker has
given a reason, she has some burden of persuasion when she seeks to depart
from such outcomes.' 9 '
To translate these general ideas into the agency context, when an agency
gives a reason to justify its course of action, it makes a commitment to that
reason. And because reasons have greater generality than the outcomes they
support, giving a reason typically implies a commitment to outcomes falling
within the reason's scope. The Supreme Court's decision in State Farm nicely
illustrates this constraining influence of reason-giving.' 92 Recall that the agency
had rescinded its rule requiring "passive restraints" in the form of automatic
seatbelts and airbags in cars, based almost exclusively on faults it found in
automatic seatbelts.1 93 The agency had previously concluded that airbags were
effective, and its defense of the rescission did not depart from that view,
reiterating that the agency "has no basis at this time for changing its earlier
conclusions in 1976 and 1977 that basic air bag technology is sound and has
been sufficiently demonstrated to be effective in those vehicles in current
use." 94 The Court took the agency to task for providing no grounds to resist a
conclusion that fell within the scope of this reason-that the agency should
require airbags: "Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the
187. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 638 (1995).
188. See id. at 639.
189. See id. at 640.
19o. Id. at 648.
191. Id. at 649.
192. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S.v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
193. See id. at 46-48; see also supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
194. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 (quoting NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, atXI-4 (1981)).
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agency, the mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the
logical response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the
installation of airbags.""19 Thus, the giving of a reason-that airbags were
effective -provided a set of grounds to which the agency committed itself, as
well as a basis for evaluating its own future actions implicating those grounds.
The ever-mounting accumulation of reasons given by the agency
contributes to nonarbitrariness and regularity in a way that supplements the
intelligible principle doctrine. The provision of a standard or a set of
boundaries within which the agency must operate, although important, does
not itself provide a check on whether agency action that falls within those
boundaries will be arbitrary or irrational. By enforcing the demand for an
ongoing process of reason-giving and justification, the Chenety principle
encumbers agencies with the rationales for their actions. Indeed, it makes each
agency action to which it applies a source of constraint for future actions. Thus,
far from articulating only the broad boundaries within which the agency must
operate, as the intelligible principle requirement does, the Chenery principle
ensures that each step casts a shadow for the placement of each subsequent
step. The agency must then either follow the projection of reasons that it has
embraced or justify why a departure is necessary. This enforced practice
promotes conditions for rationality, regularity, stability, and principled
accountability within the boundaries of acceptable discretion.
3. Judicial Manageability
As noted above, a primary basis for the Supreme Court's reluctance to
directly enforce the intelligible principle doctrine through Marbury-style
judicial review is a concern for the lack of a judicially manageable standard.196
It is worth noting that the Chenery principle does not encounter the same set of
judicial manageability concerns.
The manageability concerns with the intelligible principle doctrine appear
whether it is enforced directly through constitutional review or indirectly
through constitutional avoidance or an insistence that agencies develop
standards. The core judicial competence concern is that the intelligible
principle doctrine calls for the courts to evaluate the "permissible degree of
policy judgment" granted to an agency. '97 "No metric is easily available to
195. Id.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 159-16o.
197. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2OO1) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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answer" how much discretion is too much.19 s As a result, judicial enforcement
of the intelligible principle doctrine is likely to lead to "ad hoc, highly
discretionary rulings." 199
The use of the avoidance canon to enforce the intelligible principle doctrine
does not eliminate the need to make decisions about the degree of authority
granted to an agency. As Manning has shown, in the context of avoidance
courts still must distinguish between delegations that are questionable and
those that are not;2"' that determination also involves questions of degree.
Thus, "[t]he move from judicial review to avoidance does not eliminate the
difficulties in judicial line-drawing; it simply moves the line.""2 1
Relying on agency articulation of standards as a mode of enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine, as the D.C. Circuit did in its American Trucking
decision before it was reversed, also confronts an analogous concern.
Evaluating agency standards, like policing statutes for intelligible principles,
involves making determinations about degree-i.e., whether the standard is
sufficiently constraining. That inquiry displaces the line-drawing from
constitutional law to agency action, but it still raises questions about the
permissible degree of an agency's policy discretion.
The Chenery principle does not confront these particular manageability
problems. At one level, the Chenery principle, as noted, makes a procedural
demand: it requires that the justifications for the action be articulated at
particular times and by particular actors. The application of the Chenery
principle thus focuses the courts' attention on whether the asserted grounds for
the agency's action have shifted, say, from the time of action to the time of
litigation. That kind of judgment is central to the modern judicial role; it is
involved, for instance, when courts determine whether a litigant has stated an
objection adequately to preserve it for appellate review. 2
And perhaps more importantly, the Chenery principle does not by its nature
involve the line-drawing regarding the proper scope of agency discretion that is
front-and-center for the intelligible principle doctrine at all levels of its
enforcement. Indeed, because the Chenery principle operates to restrict the
19g. Sunstein, supra note 156, at 327.
199. Id.
zoo. See Manning, supra note 69, at 257-59.
2oi. Id. at 258.
zo. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 174-75 (1988) (assessing whether a
trial colloquy was sufficient to preserve an objection despite the fact that trial counsel did
not incant particular words in making the objection).
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domain of reasons upon which the court may uphold an agency's action, it
would appear, if anything, to make such review more manageable.
C. Scope, Fit, and Constitutional Status
On this nondelegation account, the Chenery principle enforces a limitation
on Congress's power to delegate authority to bind with the force of law. By
requiring the agency to expressly state the grounds for its action, Chenery erects
a barrier to Congress's giving away its own prerogative to act without
articulating grounds for its actions. Put another way, Chenery operates to
impede Congress from delegating its own prerogative of obscurantism." 3 On
this view, part of the tradeoff for Congress's choice to delegate authority is that
the recipient of that power must be more articulate about the grounds for its
action than Congress would be. At this point it is worth entertaining several
objections that help to clarify this account.
1. Scope
One objection to this understanding of Chenery's basis concerns the fit
between the scope of the Chenery principle and the scope of the nondelegation
doctrine. It is clear that the Chenery principle applies in judicial review of
agency adjudication and agency rulemaking.Y0 4 Because the prohibition on
giving away "legislative" powers most readily brings to mind a prohibition on
an agency's issuing binding, general, and prospective rules, the question arises
whether the nondelegation doctrine can ground Chenery's application in review
of agency adjudication as well as in rulemaking.
Despite the apparent link between nondelegation and rulemaking, the
nondelegation prohibition is not triggered solely by agency rulemaking. One
way to see this is to start with the well-established doctrine (established,
indeed, by Chenery II) that an agency generally has broad discretion to choose
how to implement a statutory grant of power, whether through rulemaking or
through adjudication."' Whether Congress's grant of power to the agency
exceeds constitutional boundaries cannot depend on the agency's own choice of
procedural format- adjudication or rulemaking. Otherwise the agency itself
203. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
("[A]gencies do not have quite the prerogative of obscurantism reserved to legislatures.").
204. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
205. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); Magill, supra note 27, at 1405-12 (providing an
account of Chenery Irs rule).
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could cure an unconstitutional grant of authority (and defeat a constitutional
challenge) simply by opting to act through one procedural form rather than
another, even though the terms of the statutory grant of authority were the
same. Indeed, the need for a standard to guide agency action, and for a
statement of reasons why the standard is met, is just as pressing, and perhaps
more so, when the agency adjudicates (and therefore declares the legal
consequences of past events) as when it acts through rulemaking.2°6
Based on the premise that the nondelegation prohibition is not limited to
agency action in a rulemaking form, there is no disjuncture between grounding
Chenery in the nondelegation doctrine and Chenery's core applications in review
of agency adjudication. In addition, it is worth noting that as a mode of
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine, the Chenety principle, like the intelligible
principle formulation, does not prohibit Congress from granting broad powers
to other institutions to make binding prospective rules. For those concerned
that strict enforcement of the conventional doctrine would disrupt the
necessary operations of modern administrative government," 7 the minimalism
of the Chenety principle in this respect should be greeted with approval (or at
least relief).
2. American Trucking
One might also object that this account runs afoul of the Supreme Court's
decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns. o8 American Trucking rejected
the idea that an agency's own standard-setting could cure an otherwise
unconstitutional delegation: "The very choice of which portion of the power to
exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had
omitted-would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority." ' 9
Does the nondelegation account of Chenety, like the approach the Court
rejected in Whitman, cast agencies in the role of curing an otherwise
unconstitutional delegation?
206. The sense of outrage from the normally restrained Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion
in Chenery II is one indication of this. See Chenery 11, 332 U.S. at 213-16 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that retroactive application of a new standard of conduct in the
adjudication amounts to the "assertion of power to govern ... without law," an objection
that would not apply if the SEC had issued a rule or regulation with prospective effect).
207. See MASHAW, supra note 117, at 148-57 (making the case for broad delegation of Congress's
substantive authority).
2o8. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
2o9. Id. at 473.
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The key point here is that the nondelegation account aims to ground the
Chenery principle as a default rule of statutory construction. By treating the
Chenery principle as an implied incident of delegation, courts avoid interpreting
statutes as vesting power in the agency to act without stating the basis upon
which it invokes the statutorily granted authority. In other words, courts avoid
interpreting statutes as violating one aspect of the contingency theory of
delegation. The account thus does not put the cure to a nondelegation problem
in the hands of agencies, but rather suggests that courts enforce the
nondelegation doctrine in part through the Chenery prohibition. American
Trucking did not disallow the use of constitutional avoidance to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine, at least in its conventional form.2"' The difference here
is that instead of relying on avoidance to narrow the substantive discretion the
statute grants to the agency, the courts impose an express statement
construction to enforce the express statement demand of the nondelegation
doctrine.
3. Constitutional Status
But what is the constitutional status of this default rule of construction?
Could Congress legislatively overrule it in a particular case? On the one hand,
the idea that Chenery carries forward enforcement of the express statement
requirements suggests that it states a rule of construction that Congress could
not reverse. On the other hand, a more modest position is also available. The
Chenery principle might be best understood as what Professor Ernest Young
has called a "resistance norm. 2 ' Such norms and doctrines provide "obstacles
to particular governmental actions without barring those actions entirely."...
Resistance norms reflect the idea that not all constitutional values are
implemented by courts in the form of an absolute prohibition on conduct.
Rather, a wide variety of norms raise the cost to the government of acting in a
particular way but do not wholly bar it from doing so. The best examples of
judicial doctrines promoting such resistance norms are clear statement rules
zio. See Bressman, supra note 163, at 454-55, 469 (arguing that American Trucking did not
foreclose courts from requiring administrative standards through constitutional avoidance).
211. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1549, 1552 (2000).
212. Id. at 1585; see also Sunstein, supra note 156, at 335 (arguing that nondelegation canons are
catalysts for congressional consideration, not express constitutional prohibitions).
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and constitutional avoidance doctrines.213 When a court imposes a clear
statement rule requiring Congress to make clear its intention to act in an area
of constitutional sensitivity, it heightens the cost for Congress to legislate in
that field. Likewise, when the Court invokes constitutional avoidance in its
construction of a statute, it is not saying that Congress could never pass a
statute with a meaning that raises serious constitutional questions- only that if
Congress intends to do so, it must be clear about it. 14
As a resistance norm, Chenery would effectively require that if Congress
wished to except an agency from Chenery's reason-giving demands, it would
have to say so explicitly. Such a default rule furthers important constitutional
values, even though it stops shy of stating a constitutional barrier to
congressional action. First, the default rule highlights to participants in the
legislative process the constitutional values at stake-which, as Young has
suggested, can have the effect of increasing opposition to the legislation by
furnishing an argument rooted in constitutional values."' Second, it increases
the political costs of enacting such a statute by requiring agreement on an
express statement of intent not to impose the Chenery principle." 6 Third, it
avoids relying exclusively on a direct constitutional prohibition. The resistance
norm conception of Chenery has the advantage of greater modesty in the
constraints it imposes on Congress, but it otherwise functions similarly to a
213. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 286 (1994)
(describing the avoidance canon as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule); Young,
supra note 211, at 1552.
214. Young, supra note 211, at 1552; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1213-16 (2006) (explaining the connection
between constitutional avoidance and clear statement rules). Perhaps the APA's reason-
giving requirements could amount to such a statement that Congress intends for Chenery
not to apply in certain circumstances. See Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. Dep't of Agric.,
876 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the court could not require a
contemporaneous statement of reasons for a rule that was exempt from the APA's notice-
and-comment requirements). As noted above, some reject the idea of a nondelegation
doctrine imposing any greater check than preventing particular members of Congress from
delegating their voting powers. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 16o, at 1721-22. On that
view, this account of Chenery would propose the principle as a judicially devised clear
statement rule. The acceptability of such a clear statement rule on that understanding is
another matter. See id. at 1761 (arguing that given the absence of a nondelegation doctrine,
construing statutes narrowly "can be justified, if at all, only on the ground that the
underlying interpretive theory lets the judges employ clear statement canons that lack
constitutional underpinnings"). For a challenge to Posner and Vermeule's account of the
nondelegation doctrine, see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003).
215. See Young, supra note 211, at 16o8.
M16. See id. at 16o8-o9.
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constitutional barrier. As Congress has evinced little interest in overruling
Chenery, the question of the ultimate status of the default, although
foundational in some respects, has relatively little practical bearing.
To summarize, the Chenery principle is based on the idea that the agency
has the duty of providing a contemporaneous statement of reasons for its
actions and lacks the power to have its actions upheld for reasons supplied by
others. But if Chenery is to be justified as an incident of delegation, we need
grounds for understanding statutory delegations as including this requirement.
The idea that the Chenery principle enforces the nondelegation doctrine
provides those grounds. That prospect emerges only once we see that the
nondelegation doctrine itself involves not only an inquiry into statutory
standards to guide agency action, but also a requirement that the agency
specify why it meets those standards. Chenery enforces that second aspect of the
nondelegation doctrine by functioning as a default rule of statutory
construction to impose statement-of-grounds requirements. Enforcing this
doctrine promotes political accountability (by making sure that the most
accountable officials within the administration take responsibility for agency
rationales) and legal regularity (by committing the agency to particular
reasons). This approach supplements the traditional nondelegation doctrine
with a judicial focus on the process and rationality of agency action. It also does
not encounter the line-drawing problems that the intelligible principle doctrine
raises either in direct enforcement or in enforcement through avoidance or
demands for administrative standards. As an enforcement mechanism of the
nondelegation doctrine, Chenery both serves as an obstacle to Congress's giving
away its own prerogative to make law without a formal statement of reasons
and highlights the costs of doing so.
IV. CHENERY IN THE AGE OF CHEVRON
This understanding of Chenery as a mode of enforcing the nondelegation
doctrine has direct implications for its relationship to other doctrines in
administrative law. In particular, it exposes the extent to which the Chenery and
Chevron doctrines are conceptually intertwined, with each having implications
for the other. In capsule form, it highlights why compliance with Chenery is a
necessary condition for Chevron deference, as well as how Chevron clarifies the
scope of Chenery's application.
A. The Chenery Principle as a Condition for Chevron Deference
Chevron, very briefly, established the familiar framework of review under
which a reviewing court is bound to accept reasonable agency constructions of
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a statute as long as the statute does not clearly resolve the issue.21 7 The basic
Chevron inquiry has two steps. First, does the statute clearly speak to the issue?
Second, if it does not, is the agency's interpretation a reasonable one?21
8
Chevron makes clear that courts should presume that a delegation of authority
to an agency to administer a statute includes a delegation of interpretive
authority to adopt reasonable interpretations of any ambiguity or gap in the
statute. It is also now widely agreed that Chevron rests on a presumption about
congressional intent-in particular, the intent to grant this interpretive
authority to agencies rather than to courts.219 The core basis for this
presumption, as identified by the Chevron opinion itself, is that specialist
agencies have greater expertise than generalist judges, and agencies'
formulations of policy are more politically accountable than those of judges.22
The clearest point of connection between Chevron and Chenery is that
compliance with the Chenery principle operates as a condition for the agency to
receive deference in Chevron Step Two. Simply put, a court should not defer to
an agency's construction of a statute at Chevron Step Two unless the agency
embraced that construction at the time it acted, not merely in litigation. The
basic logic of this structure seems relatively clear: the deference the Court
applies at Step Two is implicitly conditioned on the agency's having worked
through the problem, with reason-giving as the overt expression of its exercise
of discretion and expertise. This view is in a sense an elaboration of the
statement in Chevron that the reviewing court should defer to "a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
22 1
217. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
zi8. See id. As I discuss in detail below, the Chevron inquiry now includes a prior step,
appropriately called Chevron Step Zero, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 111; Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006), which determines whether the
Chevron framework applies to the agency's action, see infra notes 246-25o and accompanying
text.
219. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 807, 812 & n.35 (2002) (arguing that United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), put to rest "the speculation that Chevron rests on something other
than congressional intent"); Sunstein, supra note 218, at 198 (noting that the reading of
Chevron based on a presumption about congressional intent has prevailed).
220. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government .... While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices ....
221. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
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The D.C. Circuit's decision in Kansas City v. Department of Housing &
Urban Development provides a crisp example.2 Kansas City challenged the
termination by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
of an agreement providing the city with a housing grant, claiming that it was
entitled to a hearing prior to termination.13 The D.C. Circuit concluded that
the Chevron framework applied to the question and that the statute was
ambiguous with respect to the city's entitlement to a hearing.2 4 Accordingly,
the court was required to assess the statutory question under the second step of
Chevron.2 ' The statutory construction for which HUD sought deference,
however, "was never promulgated by the Secretary, or his designee, nor by
administrative regulations, nor by decisions in agency adjudications; rather,
agency counsel contend[ed] that the permissible construction of the statute for
which it [sought] approval [was] the agency's litigation posture in this
case. ')226 The court sternly declined to grant the agency deference, illustrating
that the Chenery principle operates as a condition on Chevron deference: "In
whatever context we defer to agencies, we do so with the understanding that
the object of our deference is the result of agency decision-making, and not
some post hoc rationale developed as part of a litigation strategy. ' 27 Thus,
Chenery states a necessary condition for Chevron deference: the agency's own
contemporaneous reliance on the rationale for which it seeks deference.22 s
222. 923 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 191.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) ("[W]e have
declined to give deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute when the agency
itself has articulated no position on the question .... "); Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F. 3 d
1309, 1319-21 (ilth Cir. 2001) (stating that the Chenery principle usually operates within Step
Two of the Chevron analysis, and citing additional authorities); Am.'s Cmty. Bankers v.
FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (reaching the same conclusion); Envtl. Def. Fund
v. EPA, 898 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (holding that under Chevron "[w]e cannot
sustain an action merely on the basis of interpretive theories that the agency might have
adopted and findings that (perhaps) it might have made"); Gary Lawson, Outcome,
Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv.
313, 315, 332 (1996) (noting administrative law's established demand for reasoned
explanation operating alongside Chevron).
228. In this respect, this account reveals that Chenery persists as a condition for Chevron deference
over a more general class of agency actions than those in which the agency falsely believes
that its interpretation is compelled by its governing statute. As Professor Michael Herz has
correctly pointed out, "[T] he basic premise of Chevron loses all validity if the court goes to
step two where the agency stopped at step one." Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
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Indeed, courts will ensure that the justifying rationale for an agency's decision
was clearly relied upon by the agency.229
The nondelegation account of Chenery helps to explain why the demand for
reasoned decision-making is part and parcel of the reasonableness inquiry at
Chevron Step Two. On this account, the Chenery doctrine provides a check that
the core presumptions upon which Chevron is based -the exercise of agency
expertise and the agency's political accountability- are satisfied. First, the
principle requires the grounds for the agency's decision to be articulated by the
agency at the time it acted, not merely by its lawyers during litigation. As
discussed above, that provides assurance that the politically accountable
members of the agency embrace the action's rationale.23 At the same time, it
also ensures that the rationales presented to the court have been developed
within the agency process, thus promoting the ability of the President and his
staff to monitor and respond to the agency's rationale. Further, the core
demand for reason-giving and justification provides a check that the agency
has exercised its expertise.23 Indeed, the Chenery condition on an agency's
receiving Chevron deference suggests that deference may be warranted only
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 229
(1992); see also Arizona v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 248, 253-55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
Chevron deference does not apply to an agency's interpretation that its course is compelled
by statute). But the nondelegation account of Chenery suggests we can go further: the
premises of Chevron lose validity, or at least must be actively overlooked, when the court
embraces a rationale in Step Two upon which the agency did not rely.
2ng. For instance, in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 970-71 (9 th Cir. 1986),
the court concluded that, in the ICC's decisions to approve railway acquisitions, the agency's
choice of whether to impose conditions protecting railway workers was within its discretion
and was subject to review under Chevron's second step. The ICC's orders approving the
railway transfer did not, however, expressly consider imposing labor protection conditions
on the railway seller. See id. at 971. Despite the ICC's discretion to decline to impose such
conditions, the court required some justification for its decision not to do so. The ICC
offered a viable rationale for its order in the course of litigation. See id. at 973-74 (requiring
an explanation for the agency's action in review under Chevron Step Two and the arbitrary
and capricious requirement). However, within the court's arbitrariness analysis-which
would fall under Chevron Step Two -the agency's timing for invoking that viable rationale
mattered, as Chenery suggests it should: "It would be improper for us to accept as a
sufficient justification for the ICC's decision not to impose labor protections on [the seller
railway] a reason that was not even hinted at in the ICC orders that we are reviewing." Id. at
974; see also Holland v. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 3o9 F.3d 8o8, 81o, 816-18 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(refusing to uphold an agency interpretation when the agency's grounds for it were not
clear); infra text accompanying notes 235-241.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 172-175.
231. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 26 ("'Expertise' is no longer a protective shield to be worn like
a sacred vestment. It is a competence to be demonstrated by cogent reason-giving.").
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when there is some assurance that the general Chevron presumptions hold as to
the agency's proffered interpretation.232
B. The Scope of Chenery Under Chevron
Chevron has a corresponding implication for the type of agency failures of
reason-giving to which the Chenery principle applies. Chevron clarifies that a
court may not uphold an agency's decision on how to interpret a statutory
ambiguity or gap for post hoc reasons.
The Supreme Court made clear in Chenery that the prohibition on post hoc
reasons applies only when the court reviews "a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make." '233 Some courts
have concluded that the Chenery principle applies only to lapses in agency fact-
finding or policymaking rationales but does not extend to an agency's failure to
articulate the basis for its interpretation of statutes that the agency
administers.3 4 Regardless of whether that was a plausible position prior to
Chevron, it does not make sense once Chevron is in the picture.
232. This suggests grounds for understanding the fit between the demand of reasoned decision-
making reflected in arbitrary and capricious review under the APA and Chevron's
reasonableness inquiry at Step Two. The lower courts have evinced confusion about
whether these are separate tests or whether the arbitrariness question is part of the Step
Two analysis. Commentators have inclined toward viewing arbitrary and capricious review
as part of the Step Two inquiry. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1263-71, 1285 (1997) (illustrating the debate in the D.C. Circuit and
arguing for the equivalence of Chevron's second step and arbitrariness review); M. Elizabeth
Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 53, at 85, 93-102 (providing a
compact statement of the confusion and debate surrounding the relationship between
arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron Step Two analysis, and arguing that agency
interpretations at Step Two should be subject to the requirement of reasoned evaluation
associated with arbitrary and capricious review). The nondelegation account of Chenery
suggests that the demand for contemporaneous reason-giving (treated as part of the
arbitrary and capricious review) should be part of the Step Two inquiry because it polices
the core presumptions upon which Chevron is based.
233. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see also Chenery 1, 318 U.S. 8o, 88 (1943) ("If an order is
valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to
make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an
administrative judgment.").
234. See, e.g., Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, ii F. 3d 1430, 144o (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that Chenery
does not apply to legal determinations); N.C. Comm'n of Indian Affairs v. Dep't of Labor,
725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) ("We do not, however, perceive there to be a Chenery
problem in the instant case because the question of interpretation of a federal statute is not
'a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make."'
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Once the delegation of substantive authority to an agency is viewed as
including interpretive authority, as Chevron holds, then the Chenery prohibition
should also apply to the agency's interpretation of the ambiguities and gaps of
a statute that it administers. By clarifying the scope of authority delegated to
the agency, Chevron also expands the range of issues as to which the agency
must set forth contemporaneous grounds for its decision. At a practical level,
this means that agencies must explain the bases for their interpretations of
statutes they administer. The Chenery principle, in other words, attaches to the
statutory interpretations that Chevron puts in an agency's hands.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Holland v. National Mining Ass'n235 illustrates
this demand. In Holland, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration's decision to apply nationwide a construction of
the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992 that the Eleventh Circuit
had adopted 3.2 6 The Eleventh Circuit had concluded that the Commissioner's
interpretation of "reimbursements" was inconsistent with the statute's plain
meaning and had ordered the Commissioner to recalculate based on that plain
meaning. 37 The central ground for the D.C. Circuit's reversal and remand to
the agency was that it could not discern the basis for the agency's decision to
apply the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the term "reimbursements"
nationwide. The agency, the court reasoned, might have acted because it (1)
believed that in view of Eleventh Circuit's decision, it had no other choice but
to do so, (2) decided that in view of the Eleventh Circuit decision, which
applied to certain coal payers, considerations of uniformity in administration
justified nationwide application of the same interpretation, or (3) embraced the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation as an exercise of its own reasoned judgment
on the meaning of the Act.238 The court suggested that reasons (1) and (2)
would not qualify the agency's action for Chevron deference but that reason (3)
would. 39 "[I]n a case involving the meaning of a statutory term that the
agency has delegated authority to interpret, the agency must evince
reasonableness as to the meaning of the statute to deserve deference." ' Even
though the court could imagine grounds upon which the agency acted that
(quoting Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196)); Milk Transp. v. ICC, 19o F. Supp. 350, 355 (D. Minn.
196o) (citing Chenery I for the same proposition).
235. 309 F. 3d 8o8 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
236. See id. at 8o9-1o (construing 26 U.S.C. § 9 7 o4 (b)(z)(A)(i) (2000)).
237. See id. at 812; Nat'l Coal Ass'n v. Chater, 81 F. 3 d 1077, 1O81-82 (lith Cir. 1996).
238. See Holland, 309 F.3d at 81o, 816-18.
239. See id. at 816-18.
240. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
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would have merited deference, the court still vacated and remanded the
agency's decision because it could not discern whether the agency had acted on
the basis of those particular grounds.241 The reasons for the agency's
interpretation and the agency's embrace of them are essential to whether the
agency will receive Chevron deference at Step Two. Under Chevron, the Chenery
principle applies to the agency's justification of its interpretations.
Of course, as noted at the outset, when the agency interprets a statute that
it does not administer, such as the APA, Chenety does not apply, 4 2 just as
Chevron does not.243 With regard to those statutes, Congress has not delegated
power to the "agency alone." Likewise, the Chenery principle has no
application when the question is whether the statute clearly compels or
forecloses a particular course."4 Those statutory interpretation questions-the
province of Chevron Step One- likewise are not entrusted to the agency alone
and therefore do not prevent the reviewing court from embracing rationales
not relied upon by the agency.
C. Qualifying Conditions for Chenery and Chevron
These two implications regarding the ways in which Chenery and Chevron
are intertwined- that Chenery conditions Chevron deference and Chevron
expands the scope of Chenery -suggest that it is worth considering the extent
to which they share qualifying conditions. The question of the conditions
under which the Chevron framework applies at all-what has been called
Chevron Step Zero-as distinct from the question of when an agency is entitled
to deference under Chevron Step Two, is one of the most contested in
contemporary administrative law (and a source of confusion among the lower
courts). 1 6 Still, it is possible to identify circumstances in which both Chenery
241. See id. at 818-19.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
243. Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (denying Chevron deference to
an agency's interpretation of the APA because the agency was not charged with
administering that Act); see also Stack, supra note 175, at 291 n.128 (collecting other decisions
denying Chevron deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes they do not administer).
244. Chenery 11, 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947); Chenery 1, 318 U.S. 8o, 88 (1943).
245. See Bank of Am. v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 1309, 1319-22 (lith Cir. 2001) (holding that Chenery's
prohibition on post hoc rationales has no application in Chevron Step One statutory
interpretation); supra text accompanying notes 6o-61.
246. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457-74 (2005); Sunstein, supra note 218, at 219-21.
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and Chevron clearly apply, as well as circumstances in which they both clearly
do not.
The current debate about the qualifying conditions for Chevron's
application centers around the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mead Corp."47 In Mead, the Court held that a tariff classification ruling by the
Customs Service did not qualify for evaluation under the Chevron framework.
Mead articulated a two-part test for determining the eligibility of agency action
for review under Chevron. First, Congress must have delegated authority to the
agency to bind with the force of law. Second, the agency action for which
Chevron review is sought must have been an exercise of that authority. 48 The
Court expressly embraced the presumption that Congress "contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation
that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. " "
Although the role of formal procedure in the Mead analysis is unclear,"'0 it
is still possible to identify the core cases of Chevron's overlap with Chenery.
First, whenever the agency qualifies for Chevron deference under Mead, Chenery
also will apply (though of course not to the Step One determination itself).
Simply put, under Mead, when there is a delegation to bind with the force of
law and the agency exercises that authority, the agency qualifies for Chevron
deference. That delegation also triggers Chenery.
Second, when there is no delegation to the agency to bind with the force of
law, Chevron does not apply, and neither does Chenery. Mead presumes that a
delegation to establish rights and duties is necessary to place the statute under
the agency's administration and to provide a basis to assume that Congress
intended to delegate interpretive authority. On the nondelegation account of
247. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
248. See id. at 226-27.
249. Id. at 230.
250. In Mead, the Court acknowledged, as it had to, that the lack of procedural formality does not
"decide the case." Id. at 231. There are numerous well-accepted forms of agency action that
are legally binding but that do not emerge out of formal procedure, including rules adopted
when there is "good cause" for acting outside notice-and-comment procedures, some rules
of agency procedure, and actions relating to the military or foreign affairs. See Levin, supra
note il1, at 793 (listing these examples); Sunstein, supra note 218, at 223 (noting the agency
rules of procedure and "good cause" exceptions). In a subsequent decision, the Court
emphasized that formal procedure is not a prerequisite to receiving Chevron deference. See
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). For commentary on the formality of procedure
in the Step Zero analysis, see, for example, Bressman, supra note 246, at 1475-91; Levin,
supra note 111, at 793-98; Merrill, supra note 219, at 814-17; and Sunstein, supra note 218, at
224-28.
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Chenery, Chenery applies when Congress has delegated to the agency the
authority to bind with the force of law. Thus the conferral of that power
triggers the underlying nondelegation doctrine, subjects the agency to the
Chenety rule, and creates the prospect of interpretive deference to the decisions
made on the basis of the proffered justifications.
Consider one further permutation. If an agency lacks authority to bind with
the force of law, under Mead, its position will not qualify for Chevron deference,
but it may still be granted some weight by the reviewing court under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co.2 ' But if the agency's position qualifies only for Skidmore review
because the agency lacks authority to bind with the force of law, then Chenery
will not apply. When the Court applies Skidmore review for this reason, it may
affirm the agency's position for reasons other than those relied upon by the
agency itself.
Initially, this might appear to be an odd implication. Why should the
occasion of lesser deference coincide with a lesser demand for agency reason-
giving and analysis? The answer is that when Skidmore review is occasioned by
a lack of delegation to the agency to bind with the force of law, interpretive
authority is allocated to the courts. The courts, not the agency, administer the
statute; they, not the agency, have authority to bind under the statute, and
they, not the agency, have interpretive authority over it. And because
interpretive authority is left to the courts, judicial constructions of the statute,
even ones that are based on grounds not relied upon by the agency, do not
interfere with the agency's delegated powers; the issues are, by definition, not
ones over which the agency has been granted authority. As a result, for the
court to invoke the Chenery principle when Skidmore review applies would
create an unnecessary formality: it would remand the question to the agency
for its views when the Court would ultimately determine what the statute
meant.2"2 The same core idea explains why appellate courts have not embraced
a Chenety rule in their review of lower court decisions.
251. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. Skidmore suggested that even when an
agency's interpretation is not "controlling," the agency's views "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance," and to which the court should accord as much weight as is due given the
carefulness of its consideration, "the validity of its reasoning," the consistency of its
judgments, and other "factors which give it power to persuade." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
252. Even though the Chenery prohibition does not apply to judicially administered statutes,
under Skidmore the agency will retain strong incentives to provide a persuasive justification
for its position: the court will adopt the agency's position only insofar as it is persuasive. See
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. One key difference is that under Skidmore the Court may end up
reaching the same conclusion as the agency, but for reasons other than those the agency
relied upon, whereas under Chenery that possibility is foreclosed.
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In view of their different qualifying conditions, Chevron and Chenery
remain two doctrines, not one. But they are two doctrines with tight points of
connection: Chenery is a practical and theoretical condition for deference under
Chevron, and Chevron clarifies the scope of agency explanation that falls within
Chenery's domain. If the Court were to abandon the second element of the
Mead test, as some have suggested it should,"3 then Chenery and Chevron
would be left all the closer in application as well as in principle.
V. THE REASON-GIVING PRESIDENT
This account of the foundations of Chenery invites inquiry into its
application to the President. If, as the nondelegation account suggests, Chenery
operates as a default rule of statutory construction triggered by a delegation to
bind with the force of law, then there are grounds to consider whether the
principle applies to statutes granting such powers to the President." 4
Indeed, the case of the President provides a critical test for two of the
central arguments advanced thus far-that the Chenery principle provides a
mode of enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, and that it operates as a
condition for Chevron deference. First, many of the Supreme Court's
nondelegation decisions, including its only two decisions striking down
legislation explicitly on nondelegation grounds, involved grants of authority to
the President."' Delegations to the President, far from being outlying
applications of the nondelegation doctrine, have been core instances of the
doctrine's application. The nondelegation account of Chenery thus should be
able to make sense of these central cases.
Second, whether the President has a valid claim of statutory authority plays
a critical role in judicial review of the President's actions. Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyers 6 cast statutory
authorization in this critical light. Under Justice Jackson's three-part analysis,
if the Court concludes that the President's actions have statutory authorization,
253. See, e.g., Levin, supra note iii, at 787-98 (critiquing the format doctrine).
254. At least under current law, the same inquiry would not arise if Chenery were grounded solely
in the APA. The Supreme Court has held that the APA does not apply to the President
without an express statement from Congress of such intent, see Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788, 8oo-oi (1992), and so neither would Chenery.
255. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1935); Pan. Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 406 (1935); see also, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 68o (1892); Cargo of the Brig
Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383 (1813).
256. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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then the constitutional deference given to the President's actions is at its
height.5 7 But neither Youngstown nor Justice Jackson articulated a framework
for how a court is to judge whether the President's claim of statutory power is
valid. , 8 However, if Chevron were to supply the framework for assessing the
validity of a President's assertion of statutory authority, a Chenery question
would also arise. Specifically, if compliance with Chenery is a condition of
Chevron's application in the agency context, would that same constraint also
apply if Chevron were to apply to the President?
A. Chenery and the President
The more ambitious of these two questions is whether Chenery applies
whenever the President exercises statutory power to bind with the force of law.
But assessing this question first helps to identify central concerns that carry
over into the specific evaluation of the Chevron question and critical fault lines
for differing conceptions of judicial review of presidential action.
Based on the premise of the nondelegation account of Chenery-that the
principle is triggered by Congress's grant of authority to bind with legal
force - the principle would appear to extend to the President's own exercises of
statutory power. A central and difficult question here is whether that
conclusion should hold despite the differences in the relative positions of the
President and other agency actors.
If the Chenery principle were grounded solely in concerns of political
accountability, then the basis for its application to the President would be
rather thin. Recall that part of the justification for the Chenery prohibition in
the agency context is that if a court affirmed an agency's action for post hoc
reasons, it would undermine the opportunities for monitoring-by politically
accountable officers within an agency, by the President, by Congress, and by
the public -that occur during the public process of policy formation. Chenery
pushes the embrace of the grounds for agency action outside of the agency's
general counsel's office (or the DOJ) to agency officials, and generally to more
senior officials in the agency hierarchy. But the President, it is fair to presume,
is closely identified with the position his DOJ lawyers take, at least more
publicly than agencies are associated with their lawyers' arguments. If that is
right, then the judicial acceptance of post hoc rationalizations on behalf of the
257. See id. at 635-37 (stating that if a President's action is taken "pursuant to an Act of
Congress," then it is supported by "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation" as to its constitutional validity).
258. See id.; see also Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, go IowA L. REV. 539, 558 (2005).
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President does not pose the risk that arises for agencies of blurring the lines of
political accountability. Were the nondelegation account of Chenery based
solely on these political accountability concerns, its logic would stop short of
the President.
But legality and nonarbitariness concerns still apply, and they have
particularly strong application in the context of judicial review of delegations to
the President. The Supreme Court's decision in Panama Refining5 9 clearly
articulated a principle of parity between the President and agency officials with
respect to the constitutional constraints on delegation, and it did so in the very
context of embracing the doctrines enforcing the contingency theory of
delegation that Chenery now implements (or so I contend).
The Court in Panama Refining not only concluded that section 9(c) of the
NIRA did not provide a sufficient standard to guide the President's action, but
also found constitutional infirmity because the President did not state the
predicate grounds for his orders under the section.60 It emphasized that an
express statement by the executive officers under the Act-as to why the
contingency or standard was met-was required for the action to have validity,
not only under the statute, but also under general constitutional principles. 61
Over Justice Cardozo's dissent, the Court denied any distinction between
agency officials and the President with regard to the application of these
principles. After reciting the findings requirements of Wichita Railroad and
Mahler, the Court concluded that "[w]e cannot regard the President as
immune from the application of these constitutional principles. '', 6 ' The Court
went on to state that when the President is vested with legislative powers, "he
necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a
delegation. ',,6' Even though the NIRA did not expressly require the President
to state the basis upon which he invoked its powers, the Court demanded that
the President make such a finding. 64 The President failed to provide such a
statement, and that failure of articulation, like the failure of an agency to do the
259. 293 U.S. 388.
26o. See id. at 418 ("The President was not required to ascertain and proclaim the conditions
prevailing in the industry which made the prohibition necessary."); id. at 431 ("The
Executive Order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President's action
in enacting the prohibition.").
261. See id. at 433; see also supra text accompanying notes 123-130.
262. Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 433.
263. Id.; see also supra note 152.
264. See Pan. Ref., 293 U.S. at 431-33.
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same, rendered the President's executive order "without constitutional
authority. ,,,6
This premise of parity between the President and agency officials with
regard to their respective duties to make express statements, even in the
absence of an express statutory findings requirement, has implications for
Chenery's scope. The Chenery principle, I have contended, operates to enforce
the contingency theory of delegation reflected in Panama Refining, Mahler, and
Wichita Railroad -principally, its requirement of an express statement-by
stating a default rule of construction that an agency action will be upheld only
upon grounds stated by the agency, thereby avoiding the constitutional
difficulty that would arise if the courts interpreted such statutes as including no
such requirements. If Chenery enforces this aspect of the nondelegation
doctrine, then the principle of parity between the President and agency officials
with respect to those very nondelegation requirements embraced in Panama
Refining would suggest that the President's own assertions of statutory
authority fall within Chenery's scope.2
66
B. The President Under Chevron
Suppose, as I and others have argued elsewhere, that even under Mead, the
President should be eligible for Chevron deference, 67 but only with regard to
265. Id. at 433.
266. The suggestion is not merely theoretical. For instance, in National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 1622 v. Brown, 645 F.2d 1017, 1019, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the Secretary of
Defense had issued a salary cap order pursuant to a presidential directive. The D.C. Circuit
declined to consider a statutory argument for the order that neither the Secretary nor the
presidential directive had invoked, and it reversed and remanded the case, citing Chenery.
See id. at 1024 & n.21, 1025-26. It is unclear what effect Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2oo6), has on this suggestion. In Hamdan, the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the
President's determination under Article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was
relevant to assessing the legality of the President's action under Article 36(b), under which
the President had not acted. See id. at 2791-92. That assumption is at least in tension with
the application of Chenery to the President's assertions of statutory power. But the Court
also rejected Justice Thomas's suggestion, see id. at 2842-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting), that
press statements of the Secretary of Defense were relevant to determining the legality of the
President's action: "We have not heretofore, in evaluating the legality of Executive action,
deferred to comments by such officials to the media." Id. at 2792 n.52 (majority opinion).
This reluctance suggests that something more than press statements by others, even cabinet
members, would be required to provide a basis for deferring to the President.
267. See Stack, supra note 258, at 588-89 (arguing that the President should qualify for Chevron
deference under Mead); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To
Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2603-04 (2006) (arguing for reading Mead to allow
the President to qualify for Chevron deference). For an early argument in favor of viewing
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statutes that grant power to the President by name.26 8 If compliance with
Chenery is a condition for Chevron's application to agencies, does that same
condition apply to review of the President's assertion of statutory authority
under Chevron?
One critical factor in answering this question is the justification for
applying Chevron to the President's exercises of statutory authority. Consider
two possibilities. First, the basis for according deference to the President's own
statutory assertions might stem from the President's exceptional constitutional
status. A recent article by Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning
advanced this view.26 9 They argued that the President has residual
constitutional authority to fill in the details of a legislative scheme, subject to
congressional correction.2 70 In this light, they proposed that Chevron might
best be understood as reflecting the idea that "executive branch officials are
endowed with presumptive constitutional authority, grounded in Article II, to
complete an ambiguous statutory scheme unless Congress specifies
otherwise. '271  Goldsmith and Manning did not expressly discuss the
application of Chevron to the President's own assertions of statutory authority,
but because the Article II powers they invoked to justify this view are the
President's own,2 72 on their theory, application of Chevron to the President
would appear to be Chevron's central case.73
If Chevron were to apply to the President by virtue of his residual
constitutional authority to complete legislative schemes, as Goldsmith and
Manning's arguments would suggest, then it is not clear why the Chenety
condition on Chevron's application would carry over to the President (or
indeed, have any application to the President at all). On this view, the very
exceptionalism that justifies applying Chevron to the President would call into
question the basis for importing a constraint from the agency context. This is
the President's exercise of statutory powers under the Chevron framework, at least in the
foreign affairs context, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REv. 649 (2000).
268. See Stack, supra note 175, at 307.
z6g. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 228o
(2006).
270. See id. at 2282.
27. Id. at 2301.
272. See id. at 2303-07.
273. For defense of a similar position, though grounded somewhat differently, see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217, 334 n.4o6 (1994).
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not to suggest that the Chenery constraint is incompatible with this view-only
that one arguing for its compatibility would face a heavy burden.
A second possibility is that Chevron applies to the President as an
expression of a principle of parity between the President and agency officials
when the President exercises statutory powers. Based on this principle of
parity, the President, like an agency official, should not be able to claim
statutory authority unless he can point to a particular statute that grants him
that authority. 74 And likewise, when a President implements a statute that is
committed to his administration, the President should qualify for no less
deference than would be accorded to a subordinate exercising his own
delegated authority.2 7  Because agency officials may qualify for Chevron
deference, the President may also qualify under statutes committed by name to
his administration. On this view, if the President falls within Chevron's scope
on the basis of his exercise of congressionally delegated authority, then we have
at least a prima facie reason to hold that the administrative law constraints of
Chenery should carry over to the President as well.
In order words, viewing Chenery as a condition of the President's receipt of
Chevron deference is a corollary of Panama Refining's insistence that the
President is not immune from the constitutional principles that govern an
agency's exercise of delegated power. If the President must suffer under the
constraints of parity, he should qualify for the same generous deference that
courts grant agencies (e.g., Chevron) but also be subject to the same constraints
on that deference (e.g., Chenery).
It would take us too far afield at this point to assess the extent to which a
parity principle or presidential exceptionalism best characterizes the legal
landscape or is otherwise justified. That question was contested in 1935,276 as it
is today. But it is worth noting one aspect of the institutional dynamics
generated by the suggestion that the President has a constitutional completion
274. See Stack, supra note 258, at 570-84 (arguing that the administrative law demand that an
agency's action should be upheld only if a court can identify its source of statutory
authorization should also apply to the President). But see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note
269, at 2288-91 (arguing that the completion power often authorizes the President to act in
the foreign affairs arena without specifying the specific statute that authorizes the action).
275. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 64 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)
("It is puzzling why the case [of Chevron's application] should be so much harder when the
authority is given to the Secretary's boss."); Stack, supra note 258, at 542, 585-99 (defending
Chevron's application to the President's assertions of statutory authority based on the
President's parity with other agency actors when he exercises statutory authority).
276. See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 444-48 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(arguing against courts' treating the President on par with the "humblest officer in the
government, acting upon the most narrow and special authority").
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power, even one subject to constitutional override, as Goldsmith and Manning
proposed. Goldsmith and Manning suggested that the source of this
completion power, whether constitutional or statutory, is not of great moment
because in their conception it is defeasible by Congress. 77
But the costs of this defeasibility are quite high. Whenever a court upholds
a sitting President's claim of statutory authority, as when it upholds the action
of an executive agency in the President's administration, that decision will
likely require Congress to assemble a veto-proof majority to override it. A court
decision rejecting a President's claim of statutory authority, however, does not
pit the President against Congress in any attempt to override the decision.278
'When a court upholds a President's claim of statutory authority premised in
part on the idea of a presidential completion power, it upholds the President's
claim of statutory power at the very moment at which that claim's statutory
grounding is strained (otherwise the completion power need not be invoked),
and it still puts Congress in the position of needing to assemble a
supermajority if it seeks to correct the court's decision. Thus, although the
completion authority is defeasible, in practice a judicial decision sustaining a
sitting President's actions on that basis may lock the President's construction of
the statute into the law, despite the fact that the construction extends beyond
the parameters of the powers contemplated by the statute. 9
This dynamic is of particular concern given the incentives that presidents
have to claim statutory authority for their actions. The Constitution grants the
President relatively few independent powers. Courts traditionally have been
reluctant to sustain assertions of presidential power on the basis of a
constitutional power alone."' Yet presidents are held politically accountable
277. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 269, at 2308.
278. The political dynamic following Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (20o6), nicely
illustrates this. If the Court had sustained the President's claim of statutory power, Congress
would in all likelihood have had to assemble a veto-proof supermajority if it sought to
correct the Court's determination. In contrast, because the Court rejected the President's
claim of statutory authority, the President did not have that same incentive to veto
Congress's legislation granting him the powers he sought. And Congress passed a bill, now
the Military Commissions Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (120 Stat.)
2600 (to be codified in scattered sections of lo, 18, and 28 U.S.C.), that granted most of
what the President wanted.
279. See Stack, supra note 258, at 577.
280. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers:
The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296
(2004). Hamdan provides powerful confirmation of this reluctance. The Court rejected the
President's claim that his autonomous constitutional powers authorized his creation of
military commissions in defiance of a federal statute. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-75.
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for how the government as a whole functions.281 These factors give presidents
strong incentives to achieve their agenda through "whatever-laws-happen-to-
be-on-the-books .,,8' Applying Chenery would increase the cost to the President
of a claim of statutory power, as well as force public articulation of the grounds
for the action, putting those grounds on the table of political debate. Extending
Chenery in this fashion also would emphasize that Chevron deference does not
come without constraints on the President. To the extent that such
institutional considerations have a place in determining the structure of judicial
review, there may be special reasons to believe that the President's own actions
must comply with Chenery to receive Chevron deference. This conclusion would
also affirm that even the President's political accountability and constitutional
status are not a complete substitute for reasoned explanation.283
CONCLUSION
Something more than distrust of agency lawyers is at work in the settled
prohibition on courts' upholding an agency action upon different grounds than
the agency itself relied upon when it acted. This Article argues that the Chenery
prohibition on post hoc rationalization-a prohibition that does not generally
apply in judicial review of other types of government action-helps to
constrain the scope of power that Congress may delegate. The Chenery
principle does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine by directly regulating the
substantive scope of discretion Congress can grant, which is the concern of the
conventional intelligible principle formulation of the nondelegation doctrine.
Chenery rather enforces a presumption that when Congress vests authority to
bind with the force of law in another institution, Congress does not thereby
delegate to the agency or official its prerogative to have reviewing courts supply
or substitute validating grounds for the action. That presumption implements
an aspect of the nondelegation doctrine that required Congress to condition the
grant of authority to an agency on the agency's expressly stating its grounds for
acting. While this express statement requirement has slipped from the
constitutional doctrine of nondelegation, it remains actively enforced through
Chenery. This express statement constraint, moreover, serves to check the
281. See DAVID E. LEwIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 4, 24-27 (2003)
(noting that presidents are held accountable for "the success or failure of the entire
government" and for their performance as managers of the federal bureaucracy).
282. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633, 712 (2000).
283. Cf., e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 463-64, 503-15 (2003); Strauss, supra note 175 at
10, 36-39-
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political accountability and regularity of agency action. It provides an assurance
that the object of the court's review is the product of a body or official to whom
Congress delegated authority. That constraint in turn polices the conditions for
judicial deference to agency action.
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